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THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF RESERVE FORCES UTILIZATION: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR EMPLOYMENT IN FIGHTING 
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM 
 
ABSTRACT 
This project offers a model useful for estimating the social cost of U.S. 
Reserve Forces and National Guard employment alternatives in support of the 
Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  We consider two specific alternatives in this 
report: (1) the operational force (status quo) and (2) increasing Active Duty Force 
end strength and keeping Reserve Forces as a “strategic” reserve.  We assume 
both alternatives are equal in effectiveness.  Each alternative provides certain 
benefits and costs to American society.  We also accept a budgetary cost 
estimate of $533 billion from the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis. We then focus on the social costs of these 
alternatives.  We conclude that the social cost of Alternative 1 exceeded 
Alternative 2 by nearly $50 billion from 2001 to 2006. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. GENERAL 
Following the end of the Korean War in July 1953, the United States 
adopted a policy of maintaining its National Guard and Reserve Forces as a 
strategic reserve.  This Cold War-focused force in readiness was maintained with 
the intent to mobilize in case of a major armed conflict.  During the Vietnam War, 
the Reserves and National Guard were called upon for limited assistance with 
the war effort.  Instead, the active duty component was increased through more 
aggressive recruiting and through the draft.  The Total Force Policy implemented 
in 1973 maintained this strategic reserve focus, evidenced by such measures as 
the Army’s Roundout Brigades, embedded National Guard units within Army 
divisions and capable of mobilization for wartime service. 
The 1991 Persian Gulf War tested America’s force in readiness.  Because 
the “hot” war lasted only two months (January and February), the Reserve 
Forces were quickly mobilized then de-mobilized mostly within the year.  The 
brevity of Reserve and National Guard employment during the Persian Gulf War 
and the extremely limited number of combat casualties did little to illuminate the 
potential costs of their call up.  Some of the costs associated with the National 
Guard and Reserves during this conflict could be considered transfers.  Transfer 
costs are passed to a different stakeholder in society, benefiting one at the 
expense of another.  As Mishan (1973) notes, “to the economy as a whole they 
are neither costs nor benefits; only a part of the pattern of distributing the 
aggregate product.”1 
                                            
1 E.J. Mishan. Economics for Social Decisions: Elements of Cost-Benefit Analysis (New York, 
NY: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1973), 60.  Mishan further notes that “in undertaking a cost-benefit 
analysis the economist must be careful to exclude them from the relevant magnitudes. In our 
analysis, we identify those impacts we consider transfers and exclude the amounts from the final 
CBA comparison. 
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When the Al-Qaeda terrorist network claimed responsibility for the attacks 
on September 11, 2001, it posed a clear threat to American security.  Al-Qaeda’s 
connection with the Taliban government in Afghanistan offered a tangible target 
that the United States could attack in an attempt to eradicate the powerful 
terrorist network. 
Soon, the United States would expand its focus to Iraq.  As Saddam 
Hussein refused to cooperate with United Nation’s weapons inspectors, and 
reports accumulated about Al-Qaeda groups being trained and supported in Iraq, 
the United States set out to oust Saddam Hussein and clear Iraq of potential 
terrorists and weapons of mass destruction. 
The invasion of Iraq (March 20, 2003) and the quick ouster of Saddam 
Hussein began a long conflict.  With the two-front war straining the active duty 
manpower pool, the National Guard and Reserves were increasingly called upon 
to relieve the stress.  Over the past five years, the Global War on Terrorism 
(GWOT) has far exceeded early cost estimates and is significantly affecting 
American society.  Part of the cost is associated with the employment of the 
Reserve Forces, who are often subject to multiple deployments.   
Since the creation of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973, our nation’s Reserve 
Forces have played an ever-increasing role in our military’s overall force posture.  
If senior policy makers are to make informed choices, a grounded understanding 
of the costs associated with our Reserve Forces is paramount.   
Our intent in this project is to provide a useful model to capture the social 
costs of Reserve Force employment.  We will provide two mutually exclusive 
alternatives based on the nature of Reserve Forces utilization: (1) employing the 
Reserve Forces as an operational force and (2) increasing the Active Duty Force 
while keeping the Reserve Forces as a strategic reserve force.  Each alternative 
consists of certain benefits and costs to society.  We have structured the two 
alternatives to be (about) equal in capability.  We therefore focus on social costs.   
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However, we offer no specific recommendations regarding structure or missions 
for Reserve Forces, since policy makers must also consider factors outside of the 
scope of this project. 
B. OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
The main objective of this project is to answer the question: What are the 
relative social costs of (1) the current policy of employing the U.S. military 
Reserve Forces as an operational force and (2) increasing active duty end 
strength to meet the manpower requirements of the Global War on Terrorism 
while keeping the Reserve Forces as a supporting force in readiness? 
The project will also consider the following secondary questions: 
 1)  What is the current Total Force Structure (Alternative 1)? 
 2) What would the Total Force Structure be if the Reserve Forces 
were kept as a supporting reserve (Alternative 2)? 
 3)  What are the budgetary costs associated with the alternatives? 
 4) What are the non-budgetary social costs associated with both 
alternatives? 
 5) What social costs are mainly transfers? 
 
C. METHODOLOGY 
To fully understand the costs and benefits of employing United States 
Reserve Forces (USRF) to support the Global War on Terrorism, it is helpful to 
use a carefully structured, methodical approach.  Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) 
provides “a systematic cataloguing of impacts as benefits (pros) and costs 
(cons), valuing in dollars (assigning weights), and then determining the net 
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benefits of”2 a policy decision.  While all models are typically flawed in some way, 
we hope that the CBA model we develop can usefully inform public policy 
decisions. 
We consider the Reserves and National Guard as a whole as our unit of 
analysis—which we call United States Reserve Forces (USRF).  We will develop 
a quantitative analysis, even though many of the costs associated with the war 
effort are uncertain and potentially contentious.  Nonetheless, we consider CBA 
to be a useful paradigm, in that it causes one “to think hard about categories of 
benefits and costs, to define expectations about outputs, and to pay attention to 
the tradeoffs implicit in decisions.”3  A CBA construct, informed by a variation of 
Boardman’s “Major Steps in CBA”,4 is a relatively simple approach to 
understanding the impacts of USRF employment on American society. 
Accordingly, we focus on Boardman’s first five steps, which get to the 
model-building aspects of CBA methodology.  Specifically, the first five steps 
include (1) specifying the set of alternative policies; (2) deciding who has 
standing; (3) cataloguing the impacts and selecting measurement indicators; (4) 
predicting the impacts quantitatively over the life of the policy; and (5) monetizing 
all impacts.  Because many costs associated with the war are inherently 
debatable, this analysis is not especially concerned with gathering precise data 
or providing a recommended course of action, but rather in applying CBA 
methodology as a normative tool. 
We offer an ex post CBA, which is conducted after a policy has been 
implemented and results are discernable; i.e., we are analyzing what we classify 
as the operational Reserve Forces policy employed over a five year period from 
2001–2006.  The advantage of this approach (relative to an ex ante CBA 
                                            
2Anthony E. Boardman, David H. Greenberg, Aidan R. Vining, and David L. Weimer. Cost-
Benefit Analysis: Concepts and Practice. Third Edition (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson 
Prentice Hall, 2006), 1. 
3 Edith Stokey and Richard Zeckhauser. A Primer for Policy Analysis (New York, NY: W. W. 
Norton & Company, Inc., 1978), 135. 
4 Boardman, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 8. 
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conducted prior to a policy decision) is the availability of more observed data.  As 
Boardman et al., point out, this type of CBA is useful, both as a decision-making 
and as an evaluative tool.5  Additionally, what we denote as “USRF in strategic 
reserve” serves as the alternative policy to the Administration’s “operational 
Reserve Forces” policy. 
Our major sources include numerous academic and governmental studies, 
from the RAND Corporation, The American Enterprise Institute (AEI), the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Congressional Research Service (CRS), 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research.  Also academic literature from 
journals such as Berkley’s Electronic Press, and publications such as The 
Economist.  These sources provide reasonably thorough analysis of the costs of 
war, Total Force Policy, and the costs of utilizing the Reserve Forces, but they do 
not necessarily focus on alternative policy decisions.  We assess these sources 
in Chapter II as part of our literature review. 
D. ORGANIZATION OF THE PROJECT 
This project consists of five chapters.   
Chapter I offers an introduction to the subject.  The remaining chapters 
address the primary research question as well as the secondary questions. 
Chapter II provides background on the research topic including a review of 
existing literature on the evolution of Total Force Policy, the costs associated with 
the Global War on Terrorism, and policy and cost decisions specific to reserve 
utilization. 
Chapter III presents the research methodology employed for this paper. 
Chapter IV offers an examination of the numbers developed in our 
analysis by employing our methodological approach developed in Chapter III. 
Chapter V includes the summary, conclusion, and recommendations for 
further study. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
A review of literature that is pertinent to evaluating the costs and benefits 
of employing the Reserve Forces in support of the GWOT reveals three main 
themes.  First is the “Cost of War” literature.  The second theme is “Total Force 
Policy”.  Finally, we summarize and synthesize more specific discussions on the 
costs of employing the Reserves and the National Guard, which we refer to 
collectively as Reserve Forces (USRF). 
B. COSTS OF WAR 
1. Introduction 
Leading up to the start of the Iraq conflict in March 2003, there were few 
debates over the true cost of the war.  The few estimates attempted were 
restricted to budgetary costs; social costs were not considered.  As the war 
continued, many Americans began questioning the true costs of the war, with 
budgetary cost estimates exceeding $500 billion by the start of 20076 and 
economic cost estimates ranging from $500 billion to over $2 trillion.  Several 
economists have attempted to provide a deeper understanding of this debate by 
exploring the larger economic cost of the Iraq War.   
This section examines several of these arguments.  First, a pre-invasion 
(December 2002) working paper was presented by Yale University’s William 
Nordhaus entitled The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq.7  After the 
invasion, Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec, both with the AEI-Brookings Joint 
Center for Regulatory Studies, produced a September 2005 working paper 
                                            
6 Amy Belasco. The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations 
since 9/11 (Washington DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006). 
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entitled The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq.8  Next Steven Davis, Kevin 
Murphy, and Robert Topel, all of the University of Chicago, presented War in Iraq 
versus Containment at the CESifo Conference on “Guns and Butter: The 
Economic Causes and Consequences of Conflict” in Munich, Germany in 
December 2005.9  Finally, Joseph Stiglitz of Columbia University and Linda 
Bilmes of Harvard University presented a working paper, The Economic Costs of 
the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three Years after the Beginning of the Conflict,10 
introduced at the Allied Social Science Association meetings in Boston, 
Massachusetts during January 2006.   
The following section of this paper reviews the key academic works, which 
go beyond common budgetary cost assessments, and which represent the cost 
of war literature.11  This review of the existing academic works is organized by 
the major parts of each discussion:   
 1)  A review of budgetary war costs presented by each publication.   
 2)  An analysis of the research questions presented.   
 3)  An examination of the theoretical base each author presented. 
 4)  An overview of the methodologies employed. 
 5)  A discussion of the results presented by each work.   
All but the Nordhaus article were written well after the start of the war.  Of 
the four studies, both the Wallsten and Kosec study and the Bilmes and Stiglitz 
                                            
7 William D. Nordhaus. The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq (Cambridge, MA: 
National Bureau of Economic Research, 2002). 
8 Scott Wallsten and Katrina Kosec. The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq (AEI-Brookings 
Joint Center Working Paper, 2005). 
9 Steven J. Davis, Kevin M. Murphy, and Robert H. Topel. "War in Iraq Versus Containment." 
Munich Germany, December 9 and 10, 2005. 
10 Linda Bilmes and Joseph Stiglitz. The Economic Cost of the Iraq War: An Appraisal Three 
Years After the Beginning of the Conflict (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic 
Research, February 2006). 
11 For a detailed look at a current budgetary cost perspective of the Iraq war, see Belasco, 
The Cost of Iraq. 
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study stand out as core documents and receive somewhat deeper analysis in this 
paper.12  All of the authors seek to provide an analytical framework for the policy 
debate by assessing the war’s economic costs and providing policy makers with 
a better understanding of the cost-benefit calculus of the war.  As this analysis of 
the literature reveals, they largely accomplish this goal. 
2. Budgetary Costs of the War 
Much debate about the actual budgetary costs of the War on Terror 
plagues the United States Congress.  It has proven difficult to tally these costs 
because they are represented as both regularly appropriated defense funds 
established in annual appropriations bills and as supplemental budget allocations 
that Congress has approved incrementally.  In her CRS Report to Congress, 
Belasco reveals discrepancies in war cost reporting as the “CRS, CBO, and GAO 
have all found various discrepancies in DoD figures — including understating 
budget authority and obligations, mismatches between BA and obligations data, 
double-counting of some obligations, questionable figures, and a lack of 
information about basic factors that affect costs such as troop strength or 
operating tempo metrics.”13  Cordesman claims that “There is no way to do more 
than guess at the ultimate cost of the Iraq War, Afghan War, and war on 
terrorism.”14  Nevertheless, a few economists have presented many different 
compelling arguments offering total budgetary cost of war estimates.  Several 
estimates are considered in the following paragraphs that can be drawn upon to 
guide us to a generally acceptable estimate. 
There are many varied estimates of the total budgetary cost of the War on 
Terror, including estimates from non-governmental organizations.  In their AEI-
                                            
12 We do not mean to detract from the importance of the Nordhaus and Davis et al. pieces, 
but we do wish to reflect the comprehensiveness and relevance of the standout works that the 
former two sets of authors present. 
13 Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations, 26. 
14 Anthony H. Cordesman. The Uncertain Cost of the Iraq War (Washington, D.C.: Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, 2006), 4. 
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Brookings Working Paper “The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq” Scott 
Wallsten and Katrina Kosec estimate the budgetary cost of war in Iraq to be $213 
billion to 2005.15  By March 2006, Joseph Stiglitz argued that the lifetime 
disability and healthcare costs for wounded veterans as well as increased 
recruiting and retention costs must be considered when he posited that the 
federal “budgetary costs (exclusive of interest) amount to $652 billion.”16  The 
Washington Post asserted that Congress “approved more than $609 billion” for 
the War on Terror as of May, 2007.17   Stiglitz professes that “looking purely at 
direct budgetary costs to the taxpayer, we estimate that the total cost of the Iraq 
war is in the range of $750 billion to $1.2 trillion.”18 
Several government agencies have also estimated war costs.  A 2007 
GAO report identifies total defense spending in support of the Global War on 
Terrorism to be about $454 billion.19 Amy Belasco in her March 2007 CRS 
Report for Congress argues that “Congress has appropriated about $510 billion 
in Budget Authority (BA) thus far for Iraq, Afghanistan and enhanced security for 
DoD, the State Department and the Department of Veteran’s Affairs.”20  Belasco 
breaks down the funding by operation, which includes $378 billion to support the 
war in Iraq, $99 billion for anti-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, 
$27 billion for security improvements, and over $5 billion that she could not 
allocate.21   
Robert Sunshine, the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO) Assistant 
Director for Budget Analysis provided perhaps the most compelling estimate in 
                                            
15 Wallsten, The Economic Costs of the War in Iraq, 6. 
16 Joseph Stiglitz "The High Cost of the Iraq War." The Economists' Voice 3, no. 3, 2006: 
Article 5-N/A, 2. 
17 Lori Montgomery. “The Costs of the War, Unnoticed.” The Washington Post May 8, 2007, 
sec. D. 
18 Bilmes, The Economic Cost of the Iraq War, 5. 
19 Sharon Pickup.  Global War on Terrorism: Reported Obligations for the Department of 
Defense.  (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Accountability Office, May 18, 2007), 4. 
20 Belasco, The Cost of Iraq, Afghanistan, and Other Global War on Terror Operations, 3. 
21 Ibid. 
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his testimony to Congress in July 2007.  Sunshine argued, “since September 
2001, lawmakers have provided $602 billion in budget authority specifically for 
military and diplomatic operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and other regions in 
support of the war on terrorism, and for veterans’ benefits and services.”22  The 
CBO further breaks down war costs to $533 billion spent on military operations 
and other defense activities, $30 billion to pay for equipping and training native 
security forces, $39 billion for diplomatic operations and foreign aid, and $3 
billion for additional veterans’ benefits including medical care, disability 
compensation, survivor benefits, and troop readiness.23 
To reduce the complexity of defining the economic costs of employing 
Reserve Forces in the Global War on Terrorism, we will accept Sunshine’s 
estimate of $602 billion in direct war costs and specifically, $533 billion for 
military operations.  By accepting his estimate, we can focus on the social costs 
of employing Reserve Forces without being bogged down within budgetary cost 
arguments.   
3. Revealing the Research Problem 
Nordhaus’ study was the first to conduct an ex ante24 examination of the 
potential economic costs of the looming war in Iraq.  Given that previous 
administrations have historically underestimated the costs of the nation’s wars 
prior to undertaking them,25 Nordhaus broke ground in the current conflict by 
providing evidence that proclaimed costs of the conflict were being grossly 
underestimated.  His study meant to ameliorate the lack of analytical foundation  
 
                                            
22 Robert A. Sunshine. Sworn Testimony before the Committee on the Budget, U.S. House 
of Representatives.  Estimated Costs of U.S. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and of Other 
Activities Related to the War on Terrorism.  Congressional Budget Office, July 31, 2007, 2. 
23 Ibid, 3. 
24 In the cost-benefit analysis literature, there are three basic types of analysis: ex ante, in 
media res, and ex post.  They represent before, during, and after viewpoints of policy decision-
making. 
25 Robert D. Hormats The Price of Liberty. New York: Times Books, 2007. 
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for estimates then offered.  While he posits that his estimates are wrong due to 
the fog of war, he quotes Keynes that “it is better to be vaguely right than 
precisely wrong.”26   
Despite Nordhaus’ pre-war effort, little analysis was conducted following 
the start of the war.  Consequently, Wallsten & Kosec correctly claimed that the 
war in Iraq was not subjected to rigorous cost analysis.  Hence, the real 
economic costs of the war were not being considered.  With most cost-of-war 
analysis focused strictly on budgetary costs, Wallsten & Kosec found a very real 
deficiency in the literature on the subject.  Wallsten & Kosec made the first 
serious attempt to plug the existing hole in the post-invasion cost of war 
literature. 
By clearly stating the problem, Wallsten & Kosec provided an invaluable 
service.  The Iraq War, which they argue is a controversial and expensive 
government policy, has escaped detailed analysis.  Yet the problem itself is both 
timely and compelling.  Furthermore, ongoing discussion of budgetary costs of 
the war throughout Congressional debate and popular media suggest that a true 
grasp of the economic costs of the war are still far from widely understood.27 
Davis et al.’s study builds upon one they conducted prior to the Iraq war 
that assesses costs of forcible regime change versus containment, largely from 
an ex ante perspective and seeks to systematically evaluate those two policy 
options.  They clearly state that, despite the 2005 date, they base their analysis 
on facts available in early 2003.  Indeed, a major contribution results from their 
exploration of the two principal policy options, war or containment.28 
Bilmes and Stiglitz’ study proposes a span of estimates, which identify the 
Iraq war’s actual present and estimated future costs to America, both budgetary 
and social.  They reveal that war cost estimates have varied dramatically, even 
                                            
26 Nordhaus, The Economic Consequences of a War with Iraq, 2. 
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when provided by the same government organization.  Building from the 
Congressional Budget Office’s estimate of $500 billion,29 the authors consider 
additional costs “such as lifetime healthcare and disability payments to returning 
veterans, replenishment of military hardware, and increased recruitment costs”.30 
By seeking to provide a more complete account of Iraq war costs, these 
studies are both timely and useful.  As America continues with the Global War on 
Terrorism, the bill keeps growing, with or without a clear understanding by 
America’s policy makers as to what specifically is driving those costs.  As 
Congress and the President grapple with current strategy, gaining a true 
appreciation for the cost of our policies is critical, since the decisions we make 
today will have an impact on American society, our economy, and our warfighting 
ability for generations to come. 
4. Understanding the Theoretical Base 
Nordhaus grounds his study in a review of the costs of previous major 
conflicts, from the Revolutionary War through the First Gulf War.  He then builds 
several scenarios based on inputs and outputs to provide likely outcomes that 
provide the boundaries for his analysis.  Two conceptual points are spelled out; 
first, that total economic costs are considered, not just budgetary; and second, 
that costs are incremental, beyond what would normally have been spent had the 
war not taken place.  This latter point is an important consideration, since 
including the costs of paying soldiers their normal salaries, a large cost by itself, 
would have taken place whether or not the war had occurred.  Inclusion of such 
costs in estimates inevitably skews the numbers upward. 
According to Wallsten and Kosec, discussion surrounding Iraq war costs 
finds its genesis in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, after which the United States 
began enforcing the no-flow zones in northern and southern Iraq to contain 
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Saddam Hussein’s regime.  Yet the discussion has largely centered on the 
budgetary costs of the war, not the actual, direct economic costs.  As they define 
it, budgetary costs comprise those costs found in the governmental expenditures, 
while the direct, economic costs consist of both “the opportunity cost of resources 
used in the war that cannot be used elsewhere and the welfare losses of those 
killed and wounded,” in addition to the budgetary costs.31  These economic costs 
are specific to the United States, but discussion is also given by the authors to 
the direct global costs of the war that include these costs to Iraq and other 
countries. 
The literature dealing with the economic costs of the war, as presented in 
Wallsten and Kosec’s literature review, is limited to studies conducted before the 
beginning of the war.  Identification of a gap in the literature since that time has 
helped Wallsten & Kosec identify the problem considered in this study.  The 
principal arguments of three studies from 2002 and 2003 are presented.  Their 
conclusions provide a range of economic costs, all greatly exceeding budgetary 
outlays, though one study predicts that the net benefits of the war would exceed 
the net benefits of a continued containment policy.  They make a significant 
contribution through their presentation of rigorous cost analysis several years into 
the war.  This study established a new benchmark in the cost of war literature. 
Davis et al., ground their study in earlier works assessing the economic 
consequences of the war in Iraq, building on Nordhaus’ work and drawing heavily 
on reports by government agencies, including the CBO, to construct their 
estimates on war and containment.  What makes their study particularly 
interesting is their consideration of the sustainability and effectiveness of a 
continued containment policy, along with the effects that war has on potential 
terrorist attacks on the United States.32 
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Bilmes and Stiglitz posit that the basic total direct budgetary costs of the 
war are generally agreed to be about $251 billion as of December 2005.33  This 
estimate only includes money spent by the government to conduct combat 
operations.  Other costs identified that have not been considered  by Bilmes and 
Stiglitz include costs to care for wounded personnel, additional Veterans 
Administration (VA) benefit costs to support the National Guard (who are not 
normally supported by the VA), long-term disability pay for veterans, 
demobilization costs, equipment replacement costs, increased recruiting costs, 
and the cost of interest payments on war debt.  The literature referred to by the 
authors indicates that additional costs must be included along with direct 
budgetary costs in any war cost analysis. 
5. An Overview of the Methodologies 
Nordhaus grounds his economic analysis by applying an ex ante CBA 
methodology to a variety of elements that he’s been able to quantify that 
comprise the total cost of the war in Iraq over a decade-long time frame ranging 
from 2003-2012.  Such a methodology is frequently used prior to a policy 
decision being made.   These costs are only for the United States and range from 
$99 billion to $1,924 billion.34  Direct military spending is considered, as well as 
follow-on costs such as occupation and peacekeeping, reconstruction, impact on 
oil markets, and other macroeconomic impacts. 
Wallsten & Kosec also apply a cost-benefit analysis methodology in their 
approach to understanding the economic costs of the war in Iraq.  They do so 
specifically by employing a type of CBA known as in media res, which is 
conducted during the course of an ongoing policy, namely the war in Iraq.  The 
benefits of this type of analysis, as Anthony Boardman et al. (2006) point out, in 
contrast to the ex ante CBA conducted prior to a policy decision (and used in the 
earlier studies), is that it allows for the use of observed data on impacts rather 
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than predictions, and hence provides more accurate and potentially more useful 
information than those presented in the pre-war literature.35  While CBA is 
recognized as a tool for assisting in resource allocation decisions, it is not without 
criticism, and the authors are quick to point out that the analysis yields results 
that are often imprecise and difficult to interpret.  They assume that the reader 
has a basic understanding of CBA in their critique of the methodology, including 
a priori assumptions and how to conduct the analysis.  While they do reference a 
study that discusses the controversy surrounding the use of CBA as well as its 
benefits, greater discussion would be beneficial. 
The authors do a solid job in framing their study for those who possess an 
understanding of CBA.  Leedy and Ormrod explain, “if others know the 
assumptions a researcher makes, they are better prepared to evaluate the 
conclusions that result from the assumptions.”36  These include considering 
appropriate caveats on the nature of the data and estimates, which they describe 
as both imprecise and lacking in quality.  Furthermore, while acknowledging the 
uncertain environment within which their estimates are based, their focus is on 
direct costs while avoiding costs that they are unable to monetize.  They 
conclude that they are unable to delineate whether or not the benefits of the war 
exceed the costs.  The problematic nature of the costs implies that they will be 
difficult to accurately catalog.  As a result, Wallsten & Kosec limit their goal to 
providing an analytical framework that may prove useful in the policy debate over 
Iraq, as well as provide a more thorough basis on which to assess the war’s 
actual economic costs. 
Wallsten and Kosec’s work is comprised of an ambitious mix of both 
quantitative and qualitative data.  The costs are allocated among those borne by 
the United States, Coalition Forces, and the Iraqis respectively.  Expected net 
present values of costs are included as well, expanding on a Congressional 
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Budget Office study that calculates costs out to 2015.  Finally, avoided costs are 
addressed, such as the United States no longer enforcing the no-fly zone (for the 
U.S.) and people not being murdered by the Hussein regime in Iraq (for Iraqis).  
They do an admirable job in detailing how their numbers are calculated.  A six-
page appendix details how various costs were reckoned, such as the Value of 
Statistical Life (VSL) for the cost of each fatality.  These items are rigorously 
documented, providing a useful key for anyone looking to better understand the 
rationale for their cost calculations.   
Davis et al. (2005) use a variety of historical data to estimate the 
economic costs of military employment and then apply these estimates to a 
variety of scenarios for the war in Iraq, yielding estimates ranging from $410 
billion to $630 billion.37  These costs are then compared to a counterfactual (a 
staple of CBA methodology): specifically, what a continuation of the pre-war 
containment policy would have cost.  These estimates include a containment 
policy range of $350 billion to $700 billion. 
Bilmes and Stiglitz begin by delineating direct costs and associated direct 
social costs.  It then covers estimates of macroeconomic costs, how the war 
affects the American economy.  Bilmes and Stiglitz employ mostly quantitative 
methods.  By its nature but certainly not always, economic analysis frequently 
comes to monetary equivalents.  Qualitative methods are employed only to justify 
quantitative cost estimates.  When using qualitative methods to establish costs, 
they carefully explain the difficulty of quantification.  For example, the standard 
VSL is identified as about $6.1 million.  However, Bilmes and Stiglitz quickly point 
out that juries have awarded wrongful death lawsuits for as much as $269 
million.38  Clearly, the methods employed by Bilmes and Stiglitz attempt to be 
quantitative, but they cannot escape qualitative evaluations to support their 
estimates.  This is a common theme throughout the methodological frameworks 
employed by economists in analyzing costs of war. 
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6. The Results Discussed 
Nordhaus (2002) does a good job in presenting the results of his analysis 
throughout the course of his paper, followed by a rather complex technical 
appendix that delves much deeper into the economic effects on oil markets, 
exploring both the real-income effect and the business-cycle impact.  His range 
of potential outcomes demonstrate the complexity involved with predicting costs 
prior to the war occurring.  Nordhaus uses the metaphor of “war as a giant roll of 
the dice”39 to characterize the chance involved with low or high estimates proving 
correct.  Somewhat prophetically, his high estimates are based on potential 
misjudgments during the war, which, four years later, demonstrate how quickly 
these costs can add up. 
A particular strength of the Wallsten and Kosec study is the manner in 
which the results are clearly stated and understandable.  Given the research 
problem, supporting literature, and methodology, the results presented were well 
supported.  Costs dealing with government expenditures, fatalities, and injuries 
were particularly well explained.  Wallsten and Kosec provide a grounding of 
direct costs alone exceeding $1 trillion through 2015.40  Further explanation 
would have been appreciated for discussion on avoided and future costs, as well 
as those borne by Iraqis and coalition partners.  Additionally, other costs, such as 
those borne by employers to temporarily replace deploying reservists in their 
civilian occupations, were only mentioned, though such costs are highlighted 
repeatedly in popular media and would seem especially interesting to many 
readers. 
The study sought to lay a framework for estimating the direct and avoided 
economic costs of the Iraq war for the United States, Iraq, and coalition partners, 
and in that regard the study was successful.  Economic impacts beyond the 
direct costs addressed in this study serve as the basis for suggestions of future 
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research, including macroeconomic impacts.  Based on their assessment in 
2005, things appeared to be looking brighter.  From the vantage point of 2007, 
their assessments appear to have been overly optimistic.  This does not detract 
from their study, which provides an ample foundation for future research. 
As Davis et al., point out, it is difficult to discern which policy, containment 
or war, has been more costly to date.  The basis for this conclusion depends on 
questions of who has standing in consideration of costs and benefits, and what 
costs and benefits are deemed relevant.  For instance, the authors broaden the 
economic cost-benefit calculations by incorporating Iraqi well-being and lives lost.  
The complexity of this computation is compellingly presented.  Davis et al., point 
out that, despite the complexity in gaining clarity of this issue, the systematic 
approach to the cost benefit analysis is what is critical, not the specific numbers.  
As they state, “precisely because the stakes are so high and the decisions are so 
difficult, it is essential to systematically evaluate alternatives as an input to 
decision making and the formulation of national security policy.”41 
Throughout their paper, Bilmes and Stiglitz do an excellent job of pursuing 
and detailing their primary focus in providing a range of estimates of present and 
future costs.  They list their inclusions and explain their exclusions and 
limitations.  Their work’s summary is purely a qualitative derivation of their 
analysis, with no narrative summary of the actual results.   
Bilmes and Stiglitz do a superb job of fully discussing the issues.  They 
cover both direct and indirect, budgetary and social, past and future cost 
estimates.  They qualify their estimates and provide what they describe as both 
“conservative” and “moderate” estimate ranges.42  Their approach allows the 
reader some choice in accepting the results.  In the end, the authors conclude 
that the war will cost in excess of $1 trillion, with significant social and economic 
consequences.  For example, the authors identify an expert who “estimates that 
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the value of the stock market is some $4 trillion less than would have been 
predicted on the basis of past performance” because America chose to go to war 
with Iraq.43  Another interesting cost is a trade-off in gaining Reserve Forces 
support in Iraq, but losing “first responder” support at home.  The authors cite an 
Institute for Policy Studies report that claims 44% of American police forces have 
members deployed to Iraq, an important issue when states that were ravaged by 
Hurricane Katrina desperately needed first responders. 44 
7. Budgetary Cost of Reserve Utilization 
The direct budgetary costs of utilizing U.S. Reserve Forces have also 
been researched.  By considering these costs, we can focus more directly on the 
social costs of employing the Reserve Forces in the Global War on Terrorism.  
No matter which costs are specifically included, employing Reserve Forces is 
clearly expensive.  Belasco explains that “in terms of incremental war costs 
(above peacetime levels), activating reservists is more expensive than using 
active-duty forces because DoD pays not only special pays for combat but also 
full-time rather than part-time salaries.  For active-duty troops, the only additional 
war-related costs are special pays.”45  Wallsten and Kosec argue that the 
opportunity cost of using the Reserves and National Guard in Iraq is “$3.9 billion 
per year, or $10.3 billion to date.”46  
8. Conclusion 
The economists listed here broke new ground with their CBA studies on 
the economic costs of the war in Iraq.  The implications of their analyses of the 
economic costs of the war have helped refocus the debate on the Iraqi war costs 
and have become a benchmark on which other studies now measure themselves 
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and build upon.  Additionally, the authors of these studies have shown the value 
of delving boldly into policy areas, which are not clearly defined.  Where data is 
often unavailable, numerous assumptions are necessary, and methodologies 
must be adapted to study the questions at hand.  Ultimately, their greatest 
contributions are not simply the detailed quantification and descriptive analyses, 
but rather the heuristic paradigms that they provide in approaching the problem.  
 Indeed, it is this understanding that answers the “why should I care?” 
question that all research must present to its readers.  This answer is illuminated 
in the last sentence of Wallsten & Kosec’s study where they state, “hopefully, 
policy makers and others that have better data than we have can refine our 
approach and assess whether the benefits justify the costs.”47  It is in exploring 
the economic cost-benefit calculus as it addresses the Global War on Terrorism 
that our Nation’s leaders may derive the greatest benefit on this critically 
important policy issue.  The authors have made a huge contribution by informing 
this discussion and helping to correctly structure the debate by revealing and 
exploring the full range of costs impacting the United States and others. 
C. TOTAL FORCE POLICY 
The Total Force Policy serves as the cornerstone of the way United States 
military forces are structured.  A rich body of relevant literature begins with the 
genesis of the concept in the 1960s during the Vietnam War, follows the 
implementation of the policy in 1973, and evaluates it in practice over the past 30 
years.  Controversy over how to staff America’s military is as old as the country, 
and the current policy is one that is not universally supported.  Any 
understanding of the costs of utilizing Reserve Forces in war must rightfully begin 
in discussing how the organizing concept of those forces has been created and 
sustained.  To obtain this understanding, Total Force Policy can be organized 
along four temporal divisions, as outlined in Figure 1: pre-1973 and the 
emergence of the Total Force; 1973-1990, the implementation of Total Force 
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Policy; 1991-2000; the Total Force following the 1991 Persian Gulf War and the 
end of the Cold War; and 2001 to date, the Total Force in the Global War on 
Terrorism. 
 
Figure 1.   Total Force Timeline 
 
1. Pre-1973: The Emergence of the Total Force 
In March 1969, President Richard Nixon appointed an advisory 
commission on an all-volunteer force (AVF) headed by former Secretary of 
Defense, Thomas S. Gates, Jr.48  One of the key charges of the Gates 
Commission was to analyze the social and economic costs of the AVF.  Political 
forces during the Vietnam War, among other reasons, appear to have 
necessitated a move from conscription to AVF.49  A principal outcome of the 
Commission was based on findings that earlier DoD estimates that the United 
States could not afford to end the draft were inflated and unsupportable, and that 
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the country would, in fact, reduce economic cost by moving to an all-volunteer 
force.50  As a result, the United States ended conscription in 1973 and the Total 
Force Policy was born, a structure created that was based on the concept of an 
all-volunteer force split between active and reserve components.  Bernard 
Rostker provides a comprehensive history of how the Total Force Policy has 
evolved over the past 40 years in his 2006 work, “I Want You! The Evolution of 
the All-Volunteer Force.”51 
2. 1973–1990: Implementation of Total Force Policy 
A number of studies have addressed Total Force Policy since the creation 
of the All-Volunteer Force in 1973.  John Keeley’s edited volume, “The All-
Volunteer Force and American Society,” was one of the first to assess the AVF 
system five years after its creation.  As Keeley points out, “complex 
interrelationships (exist) between our society and its military forces;” a 
relationship further characterized as “close, vital, and truly organic.”52  The 
collection of six essays that comprise this book address what were perceived as 
serious problems “concerning (the AVF’s) present vitality and its future 
viability.”53  One of the key problems noted was “questionable strategic premises, 
especially regarding the role of reserve forces.”54  These questions demonstrated 
the ongoing controversy in the 1970s surrounding the implementation of the AVF, 
noting that the structure of the military forces was central to future warfighting 
readiness.  As Keeley points out, “the viability of strategic assumptions for the 
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employment of the nation’s military forces can only be assessed against the 
condition of both the active and the reserve forces.”55 
We use the term Reserve Forces to mean the Army National Guard, Air 
National Guard, Air Force Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, 
Coast Guard Reserve, and Individual Ready Reserve.  As Keeley points out, “the 
distinction between and among the classes of reserves and types of reserve 
forces is almost Byzantine in its complexity.”56  As in his study, detailed 
distinctions between what we label collectively as Reserve Forces are beyond 
the scope of our study, and are viewed in general contrast to Active Duty Forces, 
another collective term for the current form of all the military services.  However, 
all of these forces are founded in the National Defense Act of 1916, which not 
only established several of these federal reserve forces, such as the Navy and 
Marine Corps Reserve, but transformed the relationship with the National Guard 
as well.57  As John Refuse notes, the distinction between National Guard and 
Reserve was blurred during World War I with their participation in federal service, 
and the National Guard was drawn even more closely in as a reserve component 
following the 1933 Amendment to the 1916 National Defense Act.58  Our 
collective definition also finds reference in federal statute.  Charles Heller defines 
the reserve components of the Armed Forces based upon the Title 10 United 
States Code, which provides the legislative basis for the Reserves. This is 
specifically the Army National Guard, the Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine 
Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Guard 
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Reserve.  More so, he defines the categories that comprise the Reserve forces: 
the Ready Reserve (Selected Reserve, Individual Mobilization Augmentees, and 
Individual Ready Reserve); the Standby Reserve; and the Retired Reserve.59  
While these distinctions are an important facet of Total Force Policy, most of the 
literature addresses the Reserves and National Guard collectively or else 
specifically delineates which aspect of the AVF to which they are referring. 
Perhaps one of the most interesting and enduring issues raised by Keeley 
is that the AVF debate was largely framed by economists, and policy decisions 
were largely evaluated using economic considerations (where cost effectiveness 
is seen as a “lodestone of military management”60).  As Keeley points out, “the 
success or failure of our military forces is ultimately defined in the crucible of 
war.”61  While Keeley’s point is well taken, we cannot escape the obligation to 
provide some rigor to our policy discussions that are generally compared using 
some form of cost effectiveness analysis. 
The economic underpinnings of the AVF decision are evident in much of 
the literature.  For example, Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, in his discussion of the British 
experience with the AVF, points out that many studies have looked at the 
economic consequences of conscription and generally concluded that it “is a tax 
which is exacted and paid in unremunerated labor.”62  Summarizing Paul 
Cockle’s views, “the cost to society of conscription is the foregone output.  An 
artificially low wage results in an inefficient allocation of resources between 
military and civilian communities and far from being cheap is quite expensive.”63  
Furthermore, Harries-Jenkins states that “…the exercise of economic 
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rationality…has continued to be determined by budgetary and not economic cost 
consideration” and as such, “an awareness of the social costs…is one factor 
which may inhibit the exercise of a rational preference.”64 
Another study providing one of the most careful economic treatments of 
the cost and benefits of the AVF is John Warner and Beth Asch’s “The Record 
and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Military in the United States.”65  They discuss 
efficiency and equity issues in the choice between a draft force, comprised of a 
mix between volunteers and draftees, and an all-volunteer force, and conclude 
that “the economic case for continuing the AVF is more compelling today than in 
the 1970s.”66 The authors base this not only on reduced manpower needs, on 
the whole, demanded from society, while necessitating a better-educated, higher 
quality pool of incoming personnel, but also because “conscription would entail 
higher social costs because of the greater opportunity costs of the draftees.”67 
Robert Fullinwider continued the AVF debate in his edited volume 
“Conscripts and Volunteers: Military Requirements, Social Justice, and the All-
Volunteer Force”.  The 14 essays within the book take a critical look at the state 
of the AVF 10 years after its creation, including AVF cost debates.  One such 
study by David Segal mentions that in 1983, DoD estimates showed a slight 
savings by returning to the draft.  However, he was quick to point out that 
economic studies have shown that economic costs of the draft are far greater 
than those under the AVF, even if budgetary costs have the opposite relation.  As 
Segal states, “the differential is reflected in such factors as the “conscription tax” 
borne by those drafted, the productive activities forgone by the individuals 
assigned to military service, and the inefficient allocation of resources under a 
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distorted incentive system.”68  The discussion of the relevance of budgetary 
versus economic estimates is an underlying theme threaded through the entire 
AVF discussion over the past 40 years. 
In addition to the cost dimension, implementation of the AVF during this 
time centered on the purpose and role of the Reserve Forces.  From what was 
initially termed a hollow force in the 1970s and early 1980s developed into one 
where, as Richard Hunter points out, “the purpose of the reserves is to provide 
trained people and operational equipment to augment the active forces in time of 
war…. (These units) are essential to the operational effectiveness of the active 
forces.”69  This can be quite clearly exampled in the Army’s policy development 
of what it termed Roundout brigades; “reserve component units designated to 
raise understructured Active Component Divisions to standard mobilization 
deployment configurations.”70  It’s genesis flowed in the Army’s desire to raise 
the number of total active divisions without a change in active duty personnel, 
providing one reserve brigade for every two active duty brigades to form a 
division, thereby relying on reserve units to supplement or roundout the 
understaffed active units.  The rationale for doing so is based on many factors, 
including a perceived cost savings of using the reserve, increased deterrence by 
allowing an increase in active duty divisions, enhance training opportunities for 
the reserve units, and enhancing the need for popular support of a major conflict 
by requiring a reserve mobilization to prosecute the conflict.71  The evolution of 
policy from a strategic reserve to an operational force had already begun by the 
late 1980s, when President George H. W. Bush in 1989 stated that the National 
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Guard and Reserves would be manned, trained, and equipped “not on the basis 
of their peacetime status as forces ‘in reserve’, but on the basis of their direct and 
complete integration into the operational plans and missions of the nation.”72 
3. 1991-2000: The Total Force following the 1991 Persian Gulf 
War and the end of the Cold War 
The 1991 Persian Gulf War, also known as Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm, provided the first real test of Total Force Policy since its 
inception 17 years earlier.  As Charles Heller notes, “Operation Desert 
Shield/Desert Storm validated the use of the Reserve Components for 
contingency operations.”73  Indeed, Heller’s Army War College study “Total 
Force: Federal Reserves and State National Guards” is an excellent source of 
information on the various Reserve Components, including background 
information, structure, and training, and outlines the growing trend toward 
increased Reserve Force utilization during the early 1990s.  This is largely 
attributed to the “peace dividend” following the Cold War where declining defense 
budgets led to a smaller Active Duty Force, with associated placement of more 
combat support elements into the Reserve Forces.74 
Dallas Owens’ study on the integration of Active-Duty Forces and Reserve 
Forces notes that a great effort was made following the 1991 Persian Gulf War to 
integrate active and reserve components (AC/RC), including “increased 
frequency of inter-component training, the integrations of reserve components 
into plans and operations for all contingencies, and RC participation in routine 
shaping operations.”75  This came as a result of modifying the Total Force Policy 
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originally designed for Cold War requirements to meet emergent “challenges 
posed by a smaller military, more diverse missions, and more frequent 
deployments.”76  Owens further discussed controversy over the definition of 
integration; specifically, whether it meant interchangeable AC/RC use or 
specialization in the RC which leads to an “effective combining of components” in 
their employment.77 
David Grissmer et al., noted a similar effect of the integration of Reserve 
and Active-Duty Forces.  “Operation Desert Storm provided an important 
reminder that the Total Force Policy instituted at the end of the draft relies heavily 
on reserve forces,” a trend likely to increase due to downsizing and restructuring 
of the armed forces.78  As Grissmer et al., point out, trade-offs between reserve 
force readiness and active-reserve force size should be examined closely.  It is 
possible that “larger reserve forces may lower the average readiness of all units 
and, on net, lower defense capability. “ This is due to “a trade-off between adding 
additional reserve units and the readiness of remaining reserve units.”79 More is 
not necessarily better, though the implication of such a transformation in an 
environment short of major war raises not only readiness questions but important 
cost questions as well.  This was seen in the operational readiness limitations of 
the Roundout Brigades mobilized for the Persian Gulf War who were not able to 
deploy immediately along with their Active Duty counterparts.  This issue was 
fixed after the 1991 war by not incorporating Roundout Brigades into any rapid 
deployment plans, instead assigning them to supporting roles in units that had a 
less ambitious timetable.80 
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In a similar manner, Thie and Rostker highlight the controversy 
surrounding when to use Reserve Forces, specifically delineating questions 
about activation for contingencies because they are part of the total force versus 
activation based on a clear need for their participation.81  Indeed, Thie and 
Rostker suggest that there may be a move toward greater separation “by role, 
mission, and function” rather than integration, as some have argued.82  Despite 
conflicting arguments, greater separation appeared unlikely.  The trend to 
increase Reserve Forces utilization that began in the early 1990s showed clear 
parallels to the shift from conscription to the AVF that occurred 20 years earlier, 
as well as the declining trend in overall Total Force structure end strength, as 
depicted in Figure 2.  As Grissmer et al., state, “the downsizing and restructuring 
of active forces is an historic shift toward reserve force dependence similar to the 
transition to an all-volunteer force.”83 As such, the dependence on Reserve 
Forces suggests important implications to the policy decisions that would be 
made after 2001 as the country entered into the Global War on Terrorism. 
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Figure 2.   Total Force Structure End-Strength Trend84 
 
4. Post-2001: The Total Force in the Global War on Terrorism 
The Bush Administration’s assumption of office in 2001, the Quadrennial 
Defense Review of that year, and the genesis of the GWOT following the events 
on 9/11, all formed a watershed for Reserve Forces.  Even before 9/11 occurred, 
multiple RAND white papers in Thie et al.’s detailed “Past and Future: Insights for 
Reserve Component Use,” describe how both the 2001 Quadrennial Defense 
Review and DoD had requested reviews of how the Reserves would be used for 
such activities as homeland defense and major combat operations.85 The QDR 
raised issues about readiness of Reserve Forces, endangered because of 
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downsizing and budget cuts during the 1990s.  At the same time increased 
operational tempo translated into a greater use of Reserve Forces (from 1.4 
million duty days in FY89 to 13 million duty days in FY01).86  Within Thie et al.’s 
report, Ron Sortor addressed key considerations for the use of Reserve Forces 
in contingency operations and found they basically fell into three categories: 
skills, short-term costs and benefits, and long-term costs and benefits. Skills refer 
to availability and capability within the Reserves. Short-term costs include direct 
dollar costs, readiness, recruiting, and retention, and absence for homeland 
defense.  Long-term costs include those from the short-term, in addition to 
questions on proper resource allocation and employer support.  As he points out, 
there appears to be few (if any) studies addressing these concerns in any 
comprehensive manner.87  Sortor notes that despite the great use of Reserve 
Forces during the 1990s, “what has not occurred has been the follow-up, data 
collection, and analysis required to evaluate systematically the resulting costs 
and benefits and to provide the empirical basis for policymaking for future 
(contingency operations).”88 
In a 2007 follow-up study, Thie et al., note that the roles of the Reserve 
Forces of today are different from the original intentions.  “The reserve 
components are no longer a force held in strategic reserve. Instead they are 
selectively and operationally engaged to prosecute missions as well as augment 
and reinforce the active component.  The shift in Reserve Component force 
structure between the Cold War and Post-Cold War/GWOT phases is clearly 
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depicted in Figure 3.  The total capabilities of the force, active and reserve, are 
needed to support the operations of the Department of Defense.”89  
 
Figure 3.   Reserve Component Force Structure90 
 
Bicksler et al., take the most detailed view of the role of the Reserves in 
the post-9/11 world.  Within their edited book, “The All-Volunteer Force: Thirty 
Years of Service,” William Navas points out that “(DoD) cannot expect (Reserve 
Forces) to indefinitely sustain the level of effort that they are now being asked to 
put forth.”91  As Stephen Herbits states “The future of (the AVF) will be 
                                            
89 Thie et al. Factors to Consider in Blending Active and Reserve Manpower Within Military 
Units (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Defense Research Institute, 2007), 1. 
90 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Second Report to Congress. 1 March 
2007, 12. 
91 Ibid., 168. 
 34
determined by how (DoD leadership) handles the National Guard and reserves 
over the next several years…by how the total force is adjusted so that members 
of the guard and reserve are not overused, disrupting their lives and particularly 
their roles as first responders.”92  James Helmly agrees with this point, noting 
that a failure to properly address this issue will “force our nation to return to the 
debate over conscription versus a volunteer force.”93  Helmly further notes, 
“whether we fail or succeed in this global war on terrorism will be directly linked 
to how we sustain the all-volunteer force.”94 
The literature shows that today’s Reserve Forces are no longer a strategic 
reserve but have become an operational force. This is evidenced by the dramatic 
change in duty days and other statistics.  In 1989, the Reserve Forces 
contributed 1.4 million duty-days, reaching a steady state during the late 1990s of 
nearly 13 million duty-days annually, and reaching over 60 million duty-days in 
2003.  Its 1.2 million personnel represent roughly half of the total force.95  As 
Robert Steel points out, prior to 1991, few reservists were mobilized. Yet the 
1991 Persian Gulf War and subsequent call-ups throughout the 1990s, 
culminated in a spike in reserve utilization following 9/11, 96 as clearly seen in 
Figure 4. 
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The operational utilization of large numbers of Reserve Forces have not 
been without costs.  As Edward Schrock notes, the optempo over several years 
prior to the Iraq War in 2003, in conjunction with inadequately identified 
requirements for Reserve Forces in operational plans, led to modified 
mobilization process, necessitating 264 separate mobilization orders to activate 
280,000 Reserve Forces, in contrast to 10 issued for 200,000 during the 1991 
Persian Gulf War, highlighting the lack of integration within the Total Force.98  
Additionally, Schrock notes that the Reserve Force was not equipped to the 
same level as the Active Component, including protective equipment.99 
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If we conclude that we go to war with the force we have, not the force we 
want, as Former Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld stated,100 cracks within the 
Total Force Policy were certain to be exposed and magnified over several years 
of sustained major combat operations.  As Michael Dominguez notes, the GWOT 
is a war “unlike any other our nation has fought and, importantly, is unlike the 
conflicts for which our reserve component policies, authorities, and organizations 
were designed.”101 
D. COSTS OF UTILIZING THE RESERVES 
“What has the All-Volunteer Force cost as compared to previous methods 
of building the U.S. Armed Forces?”102  This question was asked in the 
Comptroller General’s Report to the Congress in February 1978.  The question is 
equally applicable today in a modified form when we look at the costs of reserve 
utilization, a portion of AVF utilization, in the current Global War on Terrorism.  
Just as the Gates Commission found that “the cost of an all-volunteer force is 
unquestionably less than the cost of a draft force when the hidden costs of 
conscription are fully recognized,”103 so to do we hypothesize based on a similar 
relationship that the economic costs to society of reserve utilization in an 
operational force capacity are unquestionably more in terms of resources than 
maintaining them as a strategic reserve and increasing the size of the active duty 
force. 
For the purposes of our study, we define the economic cost of reserve 
utilization as the value of reserve personnel employed by DoD as an operational 
force that is not available for use in other parts of American society as they would 
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have been when employed as a strategic reserve.  More specifically, economic 
cost is comprised of the social cost to the civilian economy, which comprises the 
value of certain goods and services that could have been produced by Reserve 
Forces had they been employed in the civilian economy. 104  Furthermore, it 
should be noted that as we consider Reserve Forces in total within our study, 
American society similarly serves as our unit of analysis, inspired by Walter Oi 
and Brian Forst’s statement that “the burden of defense properly belongs to all 
citizens.”105  
Originally, government estimators, such as the GAO, dealt with the cost 
issue of the AVF by looking solely at the budgetary costs, and although criticized 
for not considering future financial costs, believed that their approach 
represented a reasonable assessment of costs and that the unavailability of data, 
along with the imprecision of future cost estimates, precluded attempts at 
measuring future costs with any degree of accuracy.106  They also did not include 
social costs that had been originally considered by the Gates Commission.  
While these are precisely the costs that are most interesting and most relevant to 
senior decision makers in the Administration,107 they are often the least 
understood and do not coincide clearly with normal government budgetary 
decision making.108 
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Cost studies of the AVF have shown mainly a bifurcation in cost thinking, 
considering it either in terms of budgetary cost (the cost to the taxpayer) or 
economic cost (the cost to society).  As such, a wide range of estimates have 
been created based on the assumptions underlying the variables considered in 
determining the specific definition of cost.109  Interestingly, as John Schank 
points out, it was not until FY83 and the creation of the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs that a study assessing the Reserve 
Forces of all three primary military branches was undertaken110, though this 
study only considered costs and not combat capability.  Schank recognizes this 
deficiency when he states “cost is only one input in policy decisions; capability 
must also be considered…. Although not an easy task, the relationships between 
costs and capabilities must be understood and considered in any policy decision 
involving change in the force structure.”111 
A follow-on cost analysis study of Reserve Force change by Schank et al., 
pointed out that many studies have been done on the cost issues of Reserve 
units, though most of these studies only address annual recurring costs of Active 
and Reserve units.  Their study addresses primary and secondary costs 
associated with changes in force structure.  As they state, “to completely 
understand the economic consequences of policy decisions affecting the force 
structure and composition, all significant cost effects must be addressed.”112  
While their study focused principally on Navy and Air Force Reserve forces, their 
conclusions seem applicable to the wider Reserve force.  For instance, as they 
point out, their study suggests, “the non-recurring costs associated with unit 
changes are highly dependent on the specific type of change and the 
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characteristics surrounding the change. As such, general cost estimating 
relationships are difficult to develop….”113  However, they also note that “force-
wide cost models can facilitate the analysis of force changes by addressing the 
interactions of force units that are difficult to quantify with the conventional 
individual unit cost models” and they specifically recommended the creation of 
such models to address the secondary or force-wide effects and to help in the 
economic analysis of policy decisions.114  As Boland points out in the context of 
strategic planning, the primary question should be one that addresses “the 
appropriate relationship between active and reserve forces in a well balanced 
total structure”.115  This is a further reason why our study considers the Reserve 
Force as a whole. 
During the President’s Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force, 
Boland (1970) created a conceptual framework that addresses the structural 
differences between active and reserve forces in which reserves are generally 
part-time, manned at lower levels, and attached to geographical and 
occupational roots in the civilian community.  This classification scheme still 
informs the debate today.  As originally conceived, Reserve Forces generally 
have two primary cost-effectiveness considerations.  First, they generally cost 
less.  Second, they are generally less capable.116  While there are certainly 
exceptions to each of these considerations within and among various Reserve 
Forces and particular types of units, Boland’s implication is that options should 
include a range of force mixes, not simply an either/or choice.  The problem, he 
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points out, is “to determine an optimum allocation among these components to 
meet specified contingencies when the relative costs are known and the resource 
level is set.”117 
Senator Edward Brooke captured the trade-off between cost and risk of 
the AVF readiness when dealing with force structure that Boland’s framework 
illuminates.  As he states, “the United States cannot afford to maintain a military 
structure capable of meeting every conceivable threat or contingency. The high 
cost of active duty forces compels the United States to limit attention to the most 
evident needs while maintaining a lower-cost standby surge capacity as 
insurance… the reserve forces would have to supply the immediate surge 
capacity which the standing active duty forces must necessarily lack because of 
cost considerations.”118 
One of the key factors surrounding the cost of Reserve Force utilization 
has been economic losses suffered by Reservists when mobilized, especially for 
extended periods of time.  Grissmer et al., note the heavy role played by 
approximately 250,000 Reserve Forces during Operation Desert Shield/Desert 
Storm, especially in serving critical combat support/service support functions.  
But many suffered economic losses during mobilization resulting from the 
difference in incomes (including benefits), and additional expenses incurred 
because of a call to active duty.  As such, these losses can affect recruiting, 
retention, and readiness, and impose hardships on reserve families.119 The 
losses were particularly substantial for individuals with high incomes or who were 
self employed.  55 percent of officers and 45 percent of enlisted personnel  
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reported income losses during the 1991 war.120 Additionally, when adding in 
those that reported economic losses in the form of additional expenses, the 
number jumps to two-thirds of the total.121 
Other studies have noted that it is not simply the individual who can 
experience economic losses.  Employers also constitute a critical component to 
the economic calculation.  As Meyer points out, “business employers suffer one 
of the greatest liabilities of the Reserve Component Policy.”  He cites a 1995 
DoD Special Task Force Report on Quality of Life, which notes “employer 
support for the Reserve component is key to the long term stability and effective 
employment of the Total Force concept.”122  Dallas Owens also raises major 
potential problems that might ensue for individuals and employers from long-term 
activation of Reserve Forces.123  While Michael Dominguez stated that DoD has 
to recognize that Reservists are a “shared resource” between DoD and the 
civilian employer.124  Robert Steel discusses the difficulty encountered by 
employers from the increased use of Reserve Forces, emphasizing that no 
employer is immune from losing a reservist to activation.125 
In “Citizen Warriors: America’s National Guard and Reserve Forces and 
the Politics of National Security,” Stephen Duncan addresses the additional 
burden Reserve Forces endure, stating, “many reservists bear a disproportionate 
personal burden in conflicts for which they have been activated.  Unlike their 
active counterparts, each day the reservists are on military duty, they are absent 
from their primary occupation.  Often, this absence does in fact cause significant 
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financial hardship.”126 There is a feedback loop in utilizing the Reserves and the 
effects it has on American society that are not present to the same degree as 
using Active-Duty Forces.  A parallel exists with earlier Total Force studies.  
James Hosek, in discussing the cost of volunteerism versus conscription, points 
out that the so called “conscription tax” is “the implicit cost to the individual being 
derailed from a civilian career, involving lost training opportunities, lost 
opportunities to acquire valuable market experience, lost consortium with family 
and friends, and increased risk of harm or injury.”127 
From a social cost standpoint, there appear to be parallels with reserve 
utilization that engender what might be termed a “reservist tax,” at least to the 
extent where mobilizations are unexpected. Ultimately, the costs of Reserve 
Forces utilization in the current Global War on Terrorism may prove too high to 
sustain current Total Force Policy.  As Duncan points out, “If policy makers 
presume unfairly upon the high motivation of reservists, subtle but real pressures 
from reserve families and employers will eventually cause serious retention 
problems and, ultimately, recruiting problems.”128  The literature suggests that 
economic costs must be seriously considered by senior policy makers to ensure 
sound decisions are made. 
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This chapter essays a cost-benefit analysis (CBA)129 of the roles chosen 
for United States Reserve Forces (USRF) during the GWOT.  (The term USRF 
as used in this report refers to the National Guard and Reserves collectively.)  
While we aim to conduct a detailed quantification of costs, we also understand 
CBA methodology as a useful framework for analysis that enhances 
understanding of a complex policy issue.130  Additionally, a well-defined 
framework provides clarity; as Stokey and Zeckhauser point out, “strict 
adherence to a clearly visible structure makes for far easier reading and 
comprehension, and opens up the analysis for evaluation and debate.”131  
Indeed, because decisions made within a cost-benefit analysis ultimately rely on 
the judgments made by the analyst, it is the ability for others to thoroughly 
evaluate the analysis in general and judgments in particular that provides one of 
its greatest strengths.132  Through our CBA we build a relatively simple model 
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representative of the impacts of reserve employment on American society, 
informed by a truncated version of Boardman’s et. al. “Major Steps in CBA”133: 
1.  Specify the set of alternative policies, 
2.  Decide who has standing, 
3.  Catalogue the impacts and select measurement indicators, 
4.  Predict the impacts quantitatively over the life of the policy, 
5.  Monetize all impacts.134 
Since each alternative is considered to be equivalent in effectiveness, the 
costs are evaluated in the traditional manner by recommending the alternative 
with the least net costs.135  However, as Stokey and Zeckhauser note, “because 
benefits and costs are measured in different units, cost effectiveness analysis 
provides no direct guidance when we are unsure whether the total benefit from 
an undertaking justifies the total cost.”136 
Concentrating on the first five steps of Boardman’s nine-step process gets 
us to the essential elements of an economic analysis of a military problem, which 
Hitch and McKean (1980) specify as the objective, alternatives, costs, model, 
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termed a cost-effectiveness analysis (CEA), since the benefits are considered identical of using 
either alternative and hence only costs are compared. In Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for 
Policy Analysis, 153.  Sassone and Schaffer also clarify the term by defining cost-effectiveness 
analysis as “a special form or subset of CBA distinguished by the difficulty with which project 
benefits can be identified in terms of dollars.” In Peter G. Sassone and William A. Schaffer, Cost-
Benefit Analysis: A Handbook (New York: Academic Press, Inc., 1978), 2. 
135 Neil E. Harlan, Charles J. Christenson, and Richard F. Vancil. “Cost Analysis,” in Edwin 
Mansfield, ed., Managerial Economics and Operations Research: Techniques, Applications, 
Cases, Fourth Edition (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1980), 37.  The authors discuss the 
absence of revenue implications, which we have interpreted to similar imply the lack (analytically) 
of benefits for our analysis.  Doing so allows us to “turn our attention to measuring the cost of 
pursuing each course of action,” as the authors note. 
136 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 155. 
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and criterion.  Further defined, the objective is the goal of forces utilization, the 
alternatives the means of accomplishing the objective, costs are the resources 
required, the model is a set of relationships, and criterion the means to choose 
an alternative, such as the one yielding the greatest net benefit.137  The analysis 
is not concerned with gathering specific data or providing a definitive course of 
action, but rather in applying the CBA methodology as a normative tool for 
practical application. 
As Stokey and Zeckhauser note, the basic aim of all models is “reducing 
the complexity of the problem at hand by eliminating nonessential features so 
that we may concentrate on the features that describe the primary behavior of 
the significant variables.”138  The principal outcome of such an analysis, as 
Sugden and Williams (1978) state, “is not an unqualified recommendation but a 
statement of the money values of those costs and benefits that the analyst has 
been able to value along with a list of those that he has not been able to 
value.”139  Indeed, this is one of the strengths of conducting a cost-effectiveness 
analysis as it applies to defense policy alternatives, for as Neuburger and Fraser 
argue, “it provides the flexibility by which political judgment can be integrated into 
the formal decision making process rather than be added on as an 
afterthought.”140 
As noted in our introduction, we use a type of CBA known as ex post—
conducted after a policy has been implemented and results are discernable.  We 
are analyzing what we classify as the operational reserve force utilization policy 
                                            
137 Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean. “Economic Choice in Military Planning,” in 
Edwin Mansfield, ed., Managerial Economics and Operations Research: Techniques, 
Applications, Cases, Fourth Edition (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1980), 571.   
138 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 13. 
139 Robert Sugden and Alan Williams. The Principles of Practical Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), 237. 
140 Henry Neuburger and Neil Fraser, Economic Policy Analysis: A Rights-Based Approach 
(Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 1993), 13. By not reducing cost and benefits to a 
single number but providing a list of quantifiable and nonquantifiable impacts as they relate to the 
alternatives, decision makers (in our case, senior policy makers) are left to interpret the analysis 
and weight various aspects accordingly. 
 46
utilized over a five year period from 2001 - 2006.  In contrast to ex ante CBA 
(conducted prior to a policy decision), ex post CBA allows for use of observed 
data on impacts rather than predictions, and hence provides more accurate 
information.  As Boardman et al., point out, this type of CBA is useful both as a 
decision-making and as an evaluative tool.141  Additionally, what we classify as 
strategic reserve force utilization serves as the counterfactual (alternative policy) 
to the operational reserve force utilization policy that has actually been 
implemented by the Bush Administration; i.e., it serves as the “what if” part of the 
equation if the USRF had been kept as a strategic reserve force and the Active-
Duty force had been increased instead of being utilized as an operational force. 
Our intent in this project is to create a “useful” model142 to capture the 
social cost of reserve employment.  In doing so, we will lay out two mutually 
exclusive alternatives based on the nature of reserve utilization, which we 
distinguish as employing Reserve Forces as an operational force versus the 
counterfactual of increasing the Active-Duty Force while keeping the Reserve 
Forces as a strategic reserve force.  Each alternative consists of certain benefits 
and costs to society that we must limit or define. 
This chapter reviews the methodology that we employ to develop our CBA 
paradigm.  First, we specify the alternatives.  Next, we describe who has 
standing.  Then, we catalog the impacts and select our measurement indicators.  
After that, we predict impacts.  Subsequently, we define how we will monetize the 




                                            
141 Boardman, Cost Benefit Analysis, 3. 
142 We utilize Stokey and Zeckhauser’s definition of a model as a “simplified representation 
of some aspect of the real world … sometimes a situation or process …a purposeful reduction of 
a mass of information to a manageable size and shape.”  As the authors point out, one always 
has to deal with the question of the tradeoff between the gains of insight and manageability with 
the sacrifice in realism engendered by the model. In Stokey and Zeckhauser, A Primer for Policy 
Analysis, 8. 
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important potential types of errors: omission and double-counting errors, 
forecasting errors, measurement errors, and valuation errors”143 that may impact 
our model. 
B. SPECIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
Our first step is to specify alternative policies.  This is an important step in 
policy analysis and is key to providing the proper foundation to decision-making.  
Analyzing an inadequate or incomplete list of alternatives will lead to a detailed 
analysis resulting in suboptimal choices, leading Harlan et al. (1980) to conclude 
that “analysis is no substitute for imagination.”144  We could consider the full 
spectrum of military force allocation options available to the United States in 
conducting the GWOT.  Because our analysis would quickly become difficult to 
cognitively manage all of the possible force employment policy permutations145 
and because of our resource limitations, we will narrow our considerations to two 
of the broadest and most obvious alternatives.  We can therefore offer a deeper 
analysis of a single alternative to our counterfactual.146 
C. WHO HAS STANDING 
Next, we consider whose benefits and costs are important within the 
scope of these policy decisions.  In order to include a reasonably sized pool of 
prospective beneficiaries, we must narrow our focus from a global to a national 
perspective.  As Sassone and Schaffer (1978) point out, “cost-benefit analysis is 
an attempt to assess social costs and social benefits … clearly, then, costs and 
                                            
143 Boardman, Cost Benefit Analysis, 5. 
144 Harlan et al., “Cost Analysis”, 35. 
145 Boardman argues that “in practice, individuals can only focus on approximately four to 
seven alternatives, at best.”, Cost Benefit Analysis, 7.  Consequently, Boardman concludes that a 
fully optimized policy decision is impossible. 
146 As McKean notes, this and similar analyses “must be regarded as inputs to decisions, not 
as oracular touchstones.” Roland N. McKean, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” in Edwin Mansfield, ed., 
Managerial Economics and Operations Research: Techniques, Applications, Cases, Fourth 
Edition (W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1980), 598.   
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benefits depend on who is included in society.”147  The term society is used to 
represent “all of the people whose interests are affected and supposedly 
considered when a particular decision is made.”148  As Mishan (1973) points out, 
“in cost-benefit analysis we are concerned with the economy as a whole, with the 
welfare of a defined society, and not any smaller part of it.”149 
Our national perspective encompasses the American populace and the 
United States Government.  Collectively, we classify this as American society.  
Additionally, we limit the boundaries of American society conceptually to provide 
for analytical clarity in looking at Reserve Force utilization.  This classification is 
consistent with the federal CBA guidelines outlined in OMB Circular A-94.150  
Like Stokey and Zeckhauser, “we assume a decision making unit in which no 
consequences spill over to affect individuals in other jurisdictions, whether those 
jurisdictions are defined by geography … or whatever.”151  We chose to focus on 
a national perspective as a first step toward a global analysis. 
D. CATALOGING IMPACTS AND SELECTING MEASUREMENT 
INDICATORS 
We will attempt to list the social cost impacts of our two alternative policies 
and clearly quantify them by associating appropriate measurement indicators.152  
As Sassone and Schaffer point out, “the raison d’être of quantification is to 
facilitate the analyzing of trade-offs.”153  We are mostly interested in cataloging 
                                            
147 Sassone and Schaffer, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 159.  The authors provide a good 
discussion on the definition and boundaries of the term “society” for the purposes of CBA. 
148 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 258. 
149 Mishan, Economics for Social Decisions, 11. 
150 Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-94, “Guidelines and Discount Rates 
for Benefit-Cost Analysis of Federal Programs” dated 29 October 1992. 
151 Ibid., 259. 
152 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 153.  In addressing defense 
expenditures and policy decisions, Stokey and Zeckhauser note that it is difficult to compare 
costs and benefits directly because of the problems engendered when attempting to monetize 
benefits.  As such, they suggest investigating alternatives “to determine which of them is the 
lowest cost method of providing (a specific) capability.” 
153 Sassone and Schaffer, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 43. 
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the impacts that “affect the utility of individuals with standing.”154  Impacts must 
demonstrate a cause-and-effect relationship between an outcome of the policy 
and its usefulness to those who have standing.  Some impacts are so obvious 
that they may be overlooked or dismissed, while others may be obscure and 
easily missed.  According to McKean (1980), there are four categories of which 
impacts fall into: costs and benefits (commensurable effects) that can be 
monetized (measured in monetary units); other commensurable effects that 
cannot be monetized; incommensurable effects that can be quantified but not in 
terms of a common denominator; and incommensurable, nonquantifiable 
effects.155  McKean notes that “an appreciation of cost-benefit analysis also 
requires an awareness that incommensurables and uncertainties are 
pervasive.”156  Campen (1986) distinguishes among impacts (cost/benefit or 
effect) by citing three principal distinctions: real versus pecuniary (transfer) 
effects; direct (primary) versus indirect (secondary) effects; and tangible and 
intangible effects.157  One of these, transfer effects, are “to the economy as a 
whole neither costs nor benefits; only a part of the pattern of distributing the 
aggregate product.”158  These transfer effects are of particular interest when 
evaluating among the two specified alternatives within this study. 
Defining the relevance and relationship of some impacts may require 
exhaustive explanation.  Many of the social impacts we consider do not have 
universally accepted measurements.  As Ray (1984) notes, difficulty in 
measuring costs and benefits sometimes makes it impossible to judge a project’s 
                                            
154 Boardman, Cost Benefit Analysis, 10. 
155 McKean, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 593.  McKean notes that “this sort of distinction 
between types of effects does serve a useful purpose, especially in warning us of the limitations 
of cost-benefit analysis.” 
156 Ibid., 595. 
157 Campen, Benefit, Cost, and Beyond, 32.  The author provides definitions and examples 
of each of these major distinctions. 
158 Mishan, Economics for Social Decisions, 60. As Mishan warns regarding CBA, the 
analyst “must be careful to exclude (transfer payments) from the relevant magnitudes.” 
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merits with much confidence.”159  In some cases, shadow pricing is used, an 
approach used to measure effects by assigning values in areas where they are 
not easily observable.160  The Value of Statistical Life (VSL) represents a 
fervently debated social cost and provides a good example of shadow pricing.161  
When confronted by controversial or complex impacts for which economists or 
social scientists have not developed clear measurements, our choice of 
measurement indicator may rely on available information and the ability to 
monetize the impact.   
For controversial impacts, we develop measurements based upon the 
best data available, identify why we selected it, and then incorporate the results 
in our overall CBA analysis.  Although we attempt to develop a reasonably 
comprehensive list of impacts, it is inevitable that we may omit some relevant 
impacts.  We will discuss this type of error further in paragraph G.   
E. PREDICTING IMPACTS QUANTITATIVELY THROUGHOUT THE 
PROJECT LIFE 
Once we have generated our list of impacts and have defined appropriate 
measurements for them, we must extend the impacts for each policy alternative 
accordingly quantitatively over a notional life of the GWOT.  As Campen notes, 
“the actual quantitative measurement of benefits and costs is, of course, the 
heart of CBA.”162  We will construct estimates for each alternative.   
However, predicting impacts can be especially challenging.  It is difficult to 
foresee how individuals or organizations with standing will react to different 
                                            
159 Anandarup Ray. Cost-Benefit Analysis: Issues and Methodologies (Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 7.  However, Ray notes that even in such situations, CBA 
may be useful for providing analytical clarity to the problem and indicating ways of increasing 
confidence in one’s ability to measure impacts accurately. 
160 Boardman, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 75.  Boardman points out, however, that “even when 
shadow prices are used, the resulting measures of benefits and costs may vary from their 
conceptually correct counterparts,” and hence it is important to address this condition. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Campen, Benefits, Costs, and Beyond, 34. 
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policies; that is, unintended consequences are always possible.  Stakeholders 
may contradict predicted behavior through compensating or adjusting behavior.  
For example, employees of an organization that loses a reserve employee to a 
mobilization may work harder out of patriotism, thus increasing instead of 
decreasing the organization’s productivity.  Substitution or spillover effects may 
arise unexpectedly as a policy alternative affects the conduct of third parties.  For 
example, the mobilization of a reservist may actually motivate others to enlist in 
the military.  Predicting these impacts also employs uncertain data sets.  
Adopting any given Value of Statistical Life measurement can be debated 
because no clear answer has been generally accepted.  Boardman emphasizes 
that “prediction is especially difficult where projects are unique, have long time 
horizons, or relationships among variables are complex.”163  A lack of 
understanding about policy cause-and-effect correlations can cause omissions of 
significant consequences as well as considerable forecast errors. 
F. MONETIZATION OF ALL IMPACTS 
We will monetize policy social impacts in order to establish a common 
metric for their valuation.  As Harlan et al. (1980) note regarding CBA’s used to 
address resource allocation problems, “money is the best common denominator 
for resources and is the basic ‘scarce resource’ (we would) like to utilize in an 
optimal fashion.”164  Our estimates will preferably be specific to Americans during 
a relevant period while CBA measurements are often founded on “willingness to 
pay”.165  Boardman explains that willingness-to-pay can be established from 
suitable market demand curves “where markets exist and work well.”166  Those 
impacts for which no one is willing to pay have zero value. 
                                            
163 Boardman, Cost Benefit Analysis, 12. 
164 Harlan et al., “Cost Analysis,” 45. 
165 Boardman, Cost Benefit Analysis, 14. 
166 Ibid. 
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As many CBA analysts have done in the past, we will not attempt to create 
new data sets as we develop our model.  Budgetary cost data is a useful starting 
point for discussing costs as a major part of total economic cost.  An important 
distinction between the two is found in the concept of opportunity cost.  
Budgetary cost “measures the cost of resources consumed in terms of the outlay 
originally made to acquire them,” whereas economic cost “measures their cost in 
relation to alternative opportunities for their employment.”167  As the literature 
review indicated, many impacts we identify have already been addressed within 
the Cost of War literature spanning a range of estimates dealing with the 
economic costs of the GWOT.  These monetized values can be used directly or 
modified as required to consider the issue of Reserve utilization.  Where 
appropriate values are readily available, we will use them.  Where values are not 
available, we will include rough estimates with an explanation. 
G. POTENTIAL TYPES OF ERROR 
The usefulness of a CBA is directly related to the quality of information 
employed in the analysis.  While an in medias res CBA typically has more 
accurate information than an ex ante analysis because the policy decision is 
ongoing, it is generally less accurate than an ex post perspective.  However, it is 
unlikely that error is completely eliminated from an analysis.  One must therefore 
always be aware that analytical techniques are “potentially dangerous to the 
extent that they convey an aura of precision and objectivity.”168  This section 
considers four significant types of errors: omission, forecasting, measurement, 
and valuation.  These four types are especially significant because competent 
analysts can mitigate most other types of errors. 
                                            
167 Harlan et al., “Cost Analysis,” 41. 
168 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 135. 
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1. Omission and Double-Counting Errors 
A large number of variables are relevant to complex policy decisions.  It is 
therefore easy for analysts to exclude some inadvertently.  Analysts also may 
decide to omit certain variables too easily because they consider them too 
insignificant.  This becomes even more difficult when experts disagree on 
certainty or impact.  Choosing the appropriate variables to include in the analysis 
can elicit simultaneous praise and critique from technical experts with widely 
varying opinions.  As Stokey and Zeckhauser point out, analyses “can be no 
more precise than the assumptions and valuations that they employ.”169 
The opposite of omission is including factors more than once.  Double 
counting is the process of considering a factor as costs or benefits in, for 
example, both the primary and the secondary markets.  The social cost of 
increased family counseling for deployed reservists and the cost of family 
counselors not being available to other families needing their services marks 
costs in both primary and secondary markets.  Boardman explains that “benefits 
(or costs) in secondary markets should not be included when prices equal social 
marginal costs.”170  That is, when the price of an impact within a secondary 
market is equal to the additional incremental cost of that impact on society, the 
impact should not be considered. 
Importantly, we must guard against what Campen refers to as an 
“overemphasis on readily measurable consequences,” since there appears to be 
a systematic bias toward incorporating elements that are easily quantified while 
omitting those that can only be qualified.  As a result, “quantified effects tend to 
dominate consideration, even if the unquantified effects are believed to be more 
                                            
169 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 135. 
170 Boardman, Cost Benefit Analysis, 509. 
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important.”171  To mitigate omission errors in this report, we attempt to clearly 
identify all significant policy influence factors.  Omissions may be easily 
incorporated into our framework later. 
2. Forecasting Errors 
Estimating the future is notoriously difficult.  Predicting changes in social 
values, empirical predispositions, and policy objectives can be difficult.  Error is 
amplified as the forecast is extended further into the future.  As Stokey and 
Zeckhauser note, “one of the disturbing features of benefit-cost analysis is that, 
as history unfortunately shows, it offers no automatic protection against heroically 
bad assumptions.”172  While some impacts are easily identified and translated 
into accurate forecasts because they can be compared with similar historical 
events, others are very complex, unique, and more distant. 
Changing American public sentiment provides a good example of the 
difficulty of predicting impacts in the GWOT.  Immediately following a major 
terrorist attack such as the ones that took place on September 11, 2001 the 
American public seemed likely to support any effort against terrorism.  As time 
has passed, the public’s demand for protection has appeared to become much 
more elastic.  An analysis conducted in 2002 would likely produce much different 
results than one conducted in 2007 when considering social costs and benefits of 
the GWOT. 
3. Measurement Errors 
Estimating impacts often leads to miscalculation because they are 
incorrectly attributed.  The benefits of increased military action in the Middle East 
                                            
171 Campen, Benefit, Cost, and Beyond, 68. Campen points out the difficulties engendered in 
attempting to incorporate quantitative and qualitative information into the policy choice calculus, 
and raises the argument of critics that because of the difficulties, that CBA is perhaps not 
adequately suited for the task at hand.  While we appreciate the challenges posed by using this 
methodology, we strongly disagree with such critics. 
172 Stokey and Zeckhauser, Primer for Policy Analysis, 148. 
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may be incorrectly assessed as reducing the number of terrorism related 
incidents if other factors are more influential such as reduced levels of tourism.  
Alternatively, if incidents of terrorism appear to be increasing as a result of 
military action in the Middle East, it may be more heavily influenced by terrorism 
related incidents being reported more frequently or accurately.  Measurements 
are significantly influenced by technology and the methodology used to measure 
the given factors.  As Hitch and McKean (1980) note, the benefits and costs of 
military alternatives or systems often have no common measure, and as such, 
we must deal with approximations that allow us to say that one alternative is 
better than another, rather than the ideal or optimal choice.173  
4. Valuation Errors 
Valuation errors are attributable to inaccurate estimates of social values 
typically called shadow prices.  One source of valuation error previously 
discussed is the Value of a Statistical Life (VSL).  In terms of shadow prices in 
the GWOT, the maximum amount of value that the public demands for an 
additional life is its shadow price.  The VSL has been hotly debated and appears 
to depend upon social status and other factors.174  The VSL is a potential 
valuation error in a CBA of Reserve Forces employment in the GWOT.  The 
relative prices of the many factors considered in a CBA tend to change over time 
causing additional valuation errors.  By clearly establishing valuation method, our 
                                            
173 Hitch and McKean, “Economic Choice in Military Planning,” 573.  As the authors point 
out, “it cannot be stated too frequently or emphasized enough that economic choice is a way of 
looking at problems and does not necessarily depend upon the use of any analytic aids or 
computational devices.”  Defense policy choices are often complex, relying on fuzzy data and 
numerous incommensurable variables.  Therefore, the analytical exercise used to understand the 
problem is often much more important, insightful, and valuable than any singular answer 
achieved at the end of the exercise itself.  McKean makes this specific point in another work 
where he states “this process of redesigning the alternatives is probably a more important 
contribution than the final cost-effectiveness exhibits.” In McKean, “Cost-Benefit Analysis,” 594. 
174 A good discussion of the VSL debate on what has been criticized as an inaccurate 
valuation of benefits and costs is provided in Campen, Benefits, Costs, and Beyond, 65.  As 
Campen notes, VSL provides a clear example of the problems with valuation, but difficulties are 
applicable to a large array of effects. 
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CBA can be adjusted to meet changing willingness to pay.  Future analysis can 
easily be adapted from our CBA evaluation paradigm. 
These four types of errors can have significant impacts on the results of 
our CBA.  While we appreciate these methodological limitations, we believe that 
CBA is a valuable tool for understanding and evaluating defense policy 
alternatives “when it is properly understood, honestly and competently applied, 
and correctly interpreted.”175  Depending on whether costs and benefits move in 
the same direction or not, their effects on each other might be either mitigating or 
amplifying.  Although this analysis is conducted ex post, we nonetheless rely on 
cost estimates to quantify the impacts associated with the alternatives.  Many of 
these cost estimates are very complex and can be difficult to independently 
estimate.  Finally, the overall objective of the GWOT is somewhat difficult to 
specify with any precision.  Is our objective to eradicate all terrorism, to contain it, 
to prevent it from influencing our national interests?  Clearly, the social costs of 
employing Reserve Forces may or may not change depending upon the 
objectives they pursue. 
                                            




In our analysis, the operational Reserve Forces policy focuses on the 
current mobilization176 of Reserve Forces to supplement and fulfill full-time 
military duties and missions and compares it with the alternative of maintaining 
U.S. Reserve Forces (USRF) as a strategic military reserve force while 
increasing Active-Duty forces.  This entails several economic benefits and 
costs—both budgetary and social—to American society, which has standing for 
the purposes of our analysis.  We then focus on key impacts, their measurement 
indicators, and dollar values assigned to them.  For the purposes of simplicity, we 
estimate relative costs of the alternatives as necessary. 
B. SPECIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVES 
We set out to develop a proper foundation for public policy by specifying 
alternative policy actions.  While selecting too few alternatives can lead to a 
narrow perspective, if we considered all possible military force alternatives 
available for the GWOT, we would quickly become bogged down.  Because of 
time limitations, we narrow our investigation to these two salient alternatives, and  
offer an accordingly deeper analysis.  While a fully optimized policy decision is 
improbable, we believe our two alternatives represent the most realistic and 
viable choices of military force employment to support the GWOT.  
                                            
176 We utilize the terms mobilization, activation, call up, and utilization interchangeably, 
although we recognize that they may have more specific meanings in different contexts, as 
pointed out in Heidi Golding’s CBO testimony before the Commission on the National Guard and 
Reserves.  Congressional Budget Office, The Effects of Reserve Call-Ups on Civilian Employers, 
Washington, D.C.: 17 May 2007, 1. 
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1. Alternative One 
The first policy alternative we consider is the status quo: employing USRF 
as an operational force in fighting the GWOT. Today’s force structure policy 
selects and employs the Reserve Forces to execute missions, augment and 
reinforce the active component.  Reserves, in fact, currently comprise 44% of the 
Total Force, as seen in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 5.   United States Total Force177 
 
 
Expanding employment from a total of 1.4 million duty-days in 1989 to 
over 60 million duty-days in 2004, the Reserve Forces are clearly being 
                                            
177 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Second Report to Congress. 1 March 
2007, 13.  
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employed at unprecedented rates not experienced since World War II.178  Figure 
6 demonstrates that from 2001 to 2006, the Reserve Forces have made up over 
one-quarter—about 28 percent—of all U.S. personnel deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan.   It is indisputable that the current force structure is employing the 
Reserve Forces as a fully operational force. 
 
Figure 6.   Total Number of U.S. Personnel Deployed to Iraq and 
Afghanistan, September 2001 – November 30, 2006179 
 
The total number of U.S. military personnel that have been deployed are 
presented in Figure 6.  From 2001 to 2006, 412,215 members of the Reserve 
Forces (230,778 National Guard and 181,437 Reserves) and 1,044,939 Active 
Duty personnel have deployed, for a total force deployment of 1,457,154 military 
personnel.  We consider the average length of deployment to be one-year, 
                                            
178 “The All-Volunteer Force: An Employer’s Perspective.” In Bicksler et al. The All-Volunteer 
Force: Thirty Years of Service (Washington, D.C.: Brassey’s, Inc., 2004), 171. 
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though individual and select unit deployments may be more or less.180  Hence, 
we consider this total number of personnel deployed to also equally represent the 
total number of man-years of forces employed for the purposes of our analysis. 
2. Alternative Two 
The second alternative we consider is maintaining USRF as a strategic 
reserve force while increasing the active component end strength in order to 
meet mission requirements.  This is the original strategy adopted by the Total 
Force Policy (of 1973), recommended by the Gates Commission in 1969 and 
implemented by President Nixon.  This policy has eroded as the active 
component was downsized and operational tempo increased after 1991.  The 
Reserve Forces have compensated for the diminished active component in order 
to meet the ever-expanding obligations of the U.S. military.  Active Duty DoD 
personnel end strength from the Korean War era through the current GWOT is 
portrayed in Figure 7. 
                                            
179 Congressional Record Service Report to Congress. National Guard Personnel and 
Deployments: Fact Sheet of 10 January 2007.  Note that the vertical axis represents the total 
number of military personnel deployed during the specified time period for each component 
represented on the horizontal axis. 
180 Loughran, Activation and the Earnings of Reservists, 1.  Loughran et al. utilize one-year 
Reserve activations as a foundation for their study. For comparative purposes, we consider 
active-duty deployments to average one-year as well. 
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Figure 7.   DoD Manpower (Active Duty Force): 1950 to 2004181 








DoD Manpower: 1950 to 2004
 
Although the Reserve Forces have undertaken increased employment as 
U.S. military commitments have expanded and active component end strength 
has dwindled, the Reserve Component has also experienced diminishing end 
strength.  From 1990 to 2004, the Reserve Component has declined by about a 






                                            
181 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006.  (Washington, D.C.), 
342.  This figure shows the general decline in the size of the Active Duty force over the past 50 
years.  Consequently, the number of missions assigned to Reserve Forces has increased. 
182 U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2006, 345. 
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Figure 8.   Military Reserve Personnel: 1990 to 2004 










Military Reserve Personnel: 1990 to 2004
 
Alternative Two eliminates reserve augmentation of the active component 
to maintain the USRF as a strategic reserve.  Instead, the active component end 
strength would be increased to meet operational requirements by the 
corresponding amount that the USRF had in fact been utilized in Alternative One.  
Thus, for Alternative Two, no USRF forces are employed in support of the GWOT 
and 1,457,154 Active-Duty personnel are deployed from 2001 – 2006.  
Alternative Two serves primarily as a notional benchmark, since we recognize 
that Total Force structure includes many necessary support functions within the 
USRF and that the United States would have been unlikely to effectively 
prosecute the GWOT without using at least some reserves in an operational 
capacity.  It is interesting to note, however, that President Bush announced his 
desire to increase the Army and Marine Corps active component end strength by 
92,000 during his State of the Union speech in January 2007.   Whether or not 
this addition to force structure would result in a decrease in the use of the USRF 
is not yet known, but the Administration’s decision may suggest a recognition of 
the high cost of Reserve utilization. 
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Edward Bruner explains in his CRS Report that “many voices in Congress 
and the military community publicly support an increase [in active duty end-
strength], and few argue against it unconditionally.”183  He also notes that the 
appropriate end strength must be determined by considering expected future 
requirements.  
C. WHO HAS STANDING 
To create a useful paradigm for policy makers, we narrow our focus to a 
national perspective.  We therefore consider social costs affecting the American 
populace and the United States Government, collectively classified as American 
society.  Our classification of “society” encompasses all American citizens.  While 
U.S. military force employment policies clearly have far-reaching implications, we 
limit our scope to American society in the interests of clarity and necessary 
brevity. 
With American society as our defined unit of analysis having standing, we 
divide society into the following categories: Employers; the United States 
Government; Reservists; and Families of Reservists.  This classification allows 
us to analyze the impacts with greater granularity and compare more clearly 
between the two Alternatives presented.  The subunit impacts collectively total to 
the net costs to American society. 
D. CATALOGING IMPACTS AND SELECTING MEASUREMENT 
INDICATORS 
In this section, we provide a list of social costs of our two alternatives.  As 
much as is reasonable, we quantify the social costs by referring to suitable 
measurement values.  Once the impacts are quantified, each can be assessed 
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more readily. However, not all impacts are amenable to quantification and 
therefore their evaluation remains more challenging. 
Impacts include the resources required to achieve a particular policy or 
course of action and the products that are created as a result of implementing the 
policy or course of action.  Boardman et al., describe impacts as inputs and 
outputs.184 Each policy decision has impacts upon American society.  In this 
section, we catalog the relevant social costs that have an affect on American 
society.  Several of these impacts may simply represent transfers between 
groups within American society, yielding no net social cost.  We identify such 
transfers where relevant. 
In order to meaningfully compare the alternatives, it is critical to quantify 
the impacts that affect American society.  While there are no universally 
accepted measurements for many of the social impacts considered, we develop 
measurements based upon available data.  We identify our rationale for given 
measurements and then evaluate the data.  Although we attempt to develop a 
comprehensive list, it is likely that we have omitted some relevant factors.  
Table 1 lists impacts according to our four subsets of American society.  
As mentioned earlier, the four subsets include employers, the U.S. government, 
Reserve Forces, and families of reservists.  Following Table 1 are additional 
details about each of the impacts, why each impact was selected, and the 
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Hiring Temporary Labor 
Additional Workload Placed on Remaining Staff 
Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees 
Re-Training Returning Employees 
Innovation 
Government 
Fatality Rates of Reserve Service Members 
Recruiting Costs 
Retention Costs 





Cost of Injuries 
Potential Job Loss 
Cost to Self-Employed Businesses 
Families 
Levels of Child Abuse 





Health Care Costs 
Family Disruption Costs 
 
1. Employers 
a. Business Productivity.  Business productivity may be affected by 
Reserve utilization.  Businesses that lose deploying reservists experience a loss 
in productivity because of the loss of continuity and resident knowledge from the 
departing employee.  While large corporations appear to absorb such losses as a 
small portion of their total income, small businesses and entrepreneurs appear to 
be affected the most.  Our metric is the number of businesses affected by 
reserve mobilizations. 
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b. Hiring Temporary Labor.  Businesses who must hire temporary 
labor to backfill positions vacated by deploying reservists experience costs in 
advertising, selecting, and training temporary employees.  Fay Hansen explains 
that “costs occur when employers pay overtime premiums to their remaining 
workers or hire temporary workers to do the work of deployed reservists.”185  Our 
metric is the number of positions filled by employers with temporary labor to 
replace deployed reserve employees. 
c. Additional Workload on Remaining Staff.  Whether or not a 
business chooses to backfill a vacant position from a deploying reservist, co-
workers often have to pick up the slack from the loss.  Braun Consulting explains 
that, “both employers and employees, in all workplaces, are often working harder 
and for more hours under difficult conditions, because of the absence of their 
fellow workers called up to active duty.”186  Our metric is the number of job 
positions not backfilled by temporary labor. 
d. Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees.  Some employers choose 
to continue paying a full or partial salary to employees who deploy because of 
involuntary activations.  In a U.S. Senate press release, Senator Chuck Schumer 
explains that, “a reservist call-up is expensive for local public safety departments 
because they often pay the salaries and benefits of reservists while the reservists 
are deployed.”187  These costs, however, represent transfers and hence a net 
social cost of zero to American society.  Our metric is the number of reservists 
who are paid both their civilian job salary and their military pay. 
e. Re-training Returning Employees.  While deployed, existing human 
capital depreciates over time.  Job skills atrophy with the employees absence 
and developing technologies are not assimilated.  The deployed reservist is not 
                                            
185 Fay Hansen. “Gearing up for Active Duty.”  (Workforce: January 2003). 
186 Braun Consulting. “Braun Consulting News.” (Vol. 7 No. 4 Winter 2003). 
187 Charles Schumer.  “Schumer: Reservist Call-Up Taking Droves of New York Cops off the 
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building up specific job-related human capital in the form of tenure and training.  
Once a deployed reservist returns to work, the employer often must retrain the 
employee in order to return atrophied skills and to make the employee current 
with recent developments.  Our metric is the total number of demobilized 
reservists who need retraining. 
f. Innovation.  Business innovation may be affected by Reserve 
utilization.  Organizations that lose reservists to deployments no longer have 
experienced people available to engage in or support innovation.  According to 
the CBO, “there are no precise data on the number of reservists who are key 
employees or who have highly specialized skills.”188  Therefore, we cannot 
establish a relevant measurement indicator. 
2. Government 
a. Fatality Rates for Reservists.  This impact recognizes USRF who 
die in support of the GWOT.  It is measured by the number of USRF who suffer 
GWOT related fatalities. 
b. Recruiting Costs.  As reserve units mobilize more frequently, 
reserve forces may experience increased costs to meet recruiting goals because 
enlistees understand that they can no longer enlist for traditional reserve service 
because they will be called to active duty regularly.  Bilmes and Stiglitz (2006) 
argue that “the military has responded to this challenge by hiring thousands of 
additional recruiters, increasing its national advertising campaigns, offering sign-
up bonuses of up to $40,000 for new recruits, offering higher retirement and 
disability benefits, increasing the “death gratuity” to $100,000, and providing re-
enlistment bonuses of up to $150,000 for experienced troops”.189  Our metric is 
the number of recruits required to fill annual reserve component recruiting goals. 
                                            
188 Congressional Budget Office.  The Effects of Reserve Call-ups on Civilian Employers.  
(Washington, D.C., May 2005), 2. 
189 Bilmes, The Economic Cost of the Iraq War, 11. 
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c. Retention Costs.  Reserve Forces may experience increased costs 
to retain service members who originally enlisted as a patriotic way of working for 
their national defense on a part-time basis. The Kimery Report emphasizes that 
“doctors, lawyers, policemen, teachers, businessmen and accountants were 
supposed to be part-time soldiers. But the Pentagon has come to rely on them 
for nearly half of its full-time military force abroad to fight a full-time war.  And too 
many are on their fourth and fifth deployment.”190 Our metric is the total dollar 
amount of re-enlistment bonus payments made. 
d. Paying for Remote Mental Health Treatment.  Reservists returning 
home from deployments do not have ready access to counselors located on or 
near major military installations.  The government accordingly funds many 
counselors to support reservists near their homes, in addition to higher patient 
loads placed on Veterans Administration health services.  Our metric is the 
number of reservists seeking treatment for mental health treatment following their 
demobilization. 
e. Mobilization Costs.  When mobilizing reservists, the government 
often pays per-diem costs for housing reservists at hotels near their activated 
unit, increased transportation costs, and increased training costs when bringing 
together geographically dispersed individuals and units.  This process can take 
months prior to deployment and a month or two following a deployment.  Our 
metric is the number of USRF personnel utilized. 
f. First Responders.  All levels of government experience a loss of 
first responders, including local National Guard, police, firefighters, and 
paramedics, when reserve units mobilize.  For example, forty-four percent of the 
nation’s police forces have one or more members deployed in support of the 
GWOT.191  Because these first responders perform a public service as opposed 
to private services provided to paying customers, this impact is separated from 
                                            
190 The Kimery Report.  Guard, Reserve Readiness at Home Continues to Deteriorate.  (7 
August 2007). 
191 Bilmes, The Economic Cost of the Iraq War, 14. 
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private organizations.  We measure this loss by the total number of first 
responders deployed from their normal jobs. 
3. Reservists 
a. Civilian Wages.  This is represented by the opportunity cost of 
using USRF and offset by the loss or gain in income when mobilized, depending 
on civilian profession.  This is measured by the average civilian income, including 
losses or gains in income, experienced by all activated USRF. 
b. Cost of Injuries.  Injured reservists experience costs depending 
upon the extent of their injuries.  These can be costly (such as severe head 
injuries, amputations, and other injuries resulting in being unable to return to 
duty).  The impact of injuries is measured by the number of USRF injured and the 
type of injury they incur. 
c. Potential Job Loss.  Despite being protected by federal law 
(Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act of 1994), many 
reservists lose their job when they return from a deployment.  Employers can 
sidestep protective laws by simply eliminating positions filled by vacant 
reservists.  We measure the loss of job impact by the number of reservists who 
lose their previous job.   
d. Cost to Self-Employed Businesses.  Perhaps hardest hit, self-
employed reservists often have no one to run their businesses when they are 
mobilized.  For example, the Associated Press reported one self-employed 
agricultural business owner deployed for one year to Kuwait had to completely 
rebuild his business upon returning.192  Our metric is the number of self-
employed reservists who have deployed in support of the GWOT. 
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4. Families 
a. Levels of Child Abuse.  Households of deployed reservists 
experience increased rates of child abuse by the remaining parent.  A study 
conducted at the University of North Carolina reveals that “when deployments 
began, reports of abuse quickly jumped from 5 in 1,000 children to 10 in 
1,000.”193 Our metric is the number of child abuse cases within families with a 
member deployed in support of the GWOT. 
b. Children’s Educational Test Scores.  Children of deployed parents 
may have lower educational test scores than when both parents are home.194  A 
recent U.S. Military Academy study by Rozlyn Engel et al., concludes that 
“evidence suggests that the adverse affects in academic achievement [as a 
result of deployments] may persist for several years.”195  Our metric is the 
number of children of deployed reservists. 
c. Depression.  While families with deploying family members may 
experience increased depression, the families of reservists do not have 
established support networks that are typically available near major military 
installations.  The U.S. Department of Veterans Administration published the 
“Iraq War Clinician Guide”, which states that, “active duty families often, but not 
always, live within the military communities where family and individual support 
and therapeutic services are more readily available in situations of deployment.  
Reserve or National Guard service members may be activated for deployment 
from civilian jobs in geographical locations that are remote from any military 
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resources.  In such situations, families can feel isolated and less supported.”196  
Our metric is the number of reserve family members suffering from depression 
during a deployment. 
d. Divorce Rates.  Deployments place additional strain on families.  
Because reservists have not traditionally planned to deploy for more than a 
month, they may experience increased divorce rates.  Our metric is the divorce 
rate for returning service members. 
e. Household Costs.  Reserve families do not have government 
housing available and experience increased costs during deployments.  Without 
both family members being available, these include daycare, landscapers, 
repairs, and deliveries.  Dewan reports that reservist families are dealing with 
many additional costs while a family member is mobilized, including automobile 
repairs, household appliance breakdowns, broken storm windows, leaky 
bathtubs, and wind damaged roof repairs.197  These costs, however, represent 
transfers and hence a net social cost of zero to American society.  Our metric is 
increased household costs.  
f. Spousal Earnings.  With one parent deployed, adults in reserve 
families often cannot work as much and experience decreased income.  Our 
metric is the number of spouses of deployed families who have to reduce or stop 
working. 
g. Health Care Costs.  Family members of deployed reservists tend to 
experience increased health care costs from the added stress of the deployment.  
These costs, however, represent transfers and hence a net social cost of zero to 
American society.  Our metric is the increase in health care costs. 
h. Family Disruption Costs.  As reservists deploy, the family often 
experiences expensive disruptions.  Some family members relocate to be closer 
                                            
196 U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, National Center for PTSD.  Iraq War Clinician 
Guide, 83. 
197 Shaila Dewain. “State Taxpayers Providing Relief to Military Families.” (The New York 
Times: 8 March 2005). 
 72
to extended family.  Others experience increased travel costs from visiting 
extended family for support throughout the deployment.  These costs, however, 
represent transfers and hence a net social cost of zero to American society.  Our 
metric is the cost per family attributed to disruption. 
E. PREDICTING IMPACTS QUANTITATIVELY THROUGHOUT THE 
PROJECT LIFE 
Now that each of the relevant impacts has been identified with their 
respective measurement indicators, we must consider the impact throughout the 
life of the GWOT, defined within our ex post analysis as the post-9/11 period 
from 2001 – 2006.. 
1. Employers 
a. Lost Business Productivity.  Jeffrey Gangemi identifies 371 
applications to the Small Business Administration for Military Reservist Economic 
Injury Disaster Loans (MREIDL) as of January 2007.198  Given the fact that many 
small business owners may not be aware of the MREIDL, many may not have 
submitted applications for it.  We therefore estimate (conservatively) that 371 
businesses have experienced substantial losses as a result of reservist 
mobilization from 2001 to 2006. 
b. Hiring Temporary Labor.  A Braun Consulting report cites an April 
2003 survey by the Society for Human Resource Management in which about 
half of the 320 respondents claimed to have hired temporary replacement 
workers to fill vacancies left by activated reservists.  We deduct 9 percent of self-
employed activated reservists (Thompson, 2007), leaving 375,115 total 
activations.  We accordingly estimate that businesses have hired temporary 
workers to fill 30 percent of all positions vacated by activated reservists, or 
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112,535.  We consider the remaining job vacancies to be full-time students or 
that the employers choose to assign additional work to remaining staff. 
c. Additional Workload on Remaining Staff.  As an alternative to hiring 
temporary labor to backfill vacant positions, we calculate the additional stress 
placed on remaining staff to affect 60 percent of the non-self employed workforce 
that has been mobilized, or 225,069 total affected from 2001 to 2006. 
d. Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees.  The Reserve Officers 
Association (ROA) based in Washington, D.C. has conducted annual surveys of 
Fortune’s top 500 corporations asking about pay and benefits provided to their 
deployed reservists.  From the ROA’s 2006 survey, about 31 percent (156) of the 
Fortune 500 companies pay full or differential salaries of their activated 
reservists.199  Applying this percentage to the non-self employed activated 
reserve population determined by Thompson (2007) to be 91 percent of the 
412,215 we estimate that 116,285 reservists received full or differential pay from 
their civilian employers while they are deployed. 
e. Re-training Returning Employees.  Thompson argues that “a full 
third of the reserve components are made up of professionals and managers” 
and that “less than 20 percent of the reserve force” is made up of the “lowest 
skilled category of the labor pool” who wouldn’t need retraining.200  We estimate 
that half of the 375,115 activated reservists who are not self-employed will be 
trained when returning to their job following a mobilization, for a total of 187,558. 
f. Reduced Innovation.  While it seems clear that businesses would 
experience a reduction in innovation when they lose critical employees to reserve 
activations, we are unable to estimate the impact due to a lack of available 
information. 
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2. Government 
a. Fatality Rates for Reservists.  Reservists have suffered 788 
hostile/non-hostile killed in action (KIA).201  Of the total number deployed over 
this period of time, the KIA rate for Reservists is 0.19%. 
b. Increased Recruiting Costs.  From 2001 to 2006 we estimate that 
Total Force requirements for new recruits is 181,000 per year.202  The reserve 
component requires 44 percent—a total of 79,640 new recruits annually.  
Therefore, over the course of this analysis, 398,200 recruits were required.  
c. Increased Retention Costs.  We estimate that the average annual 
total of re-enlistment bonuses paid by DoD is $602,000,000203.  Of this amount, 
we estimate that 44 percent applies to the reserve component. 
d. Paying for Remote Mental Health Treatment.  Testimony by CBO 
Deputy Assistant Director for National Security, Matthew Goldberg identified that 
“the incidence rate of PTSD [Post Traumatic Stress Disorder] is 17 percent.”204  
Using 412,215 reservists returning from deployments in support of the GWOT, 
we estimate that 70,077 will seek mental health treatment. 
e. Mobilization Costs.   Mobilization costs from 2001 to 2006 are 
proportional to the number of Reservists mobilized, since these costs are 
incurred for all USRF when mobilized and demobilized.  Therefore, the total 
412,215 of USRF deployed serves as our metric.  
f. Loss of First Responders.  An August 2007 Kimery Report stated 
that the Massachusetts state Executive Office of Public Safety identified 30 of 
                                            
201 Defense Manpower Data Center, Personnel & Procurement Reports and Data Files. 
202 Office of Management and Budget.  Department of Defense Recruiting Assessment (at 
ExpectMore.gov, 13 August 2007). 
203 Associated Press.  Iraq GI Retention Efforts May Bring Longer Tours, Better Pay (CNN: 
11 April 2007). 
204 Congressional Budget Office.  Projecting the Costs to Care for Veterans of U.S. Military 
Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, statement by Matthew S. Goldberg, Deputy Assistant 
Director for National Security.  (Washington, D.C., 17 October 2007), 10. 
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190 deployed public safety members worked in law enforcement or other 
emergency services.205  From this report, we estimate that 16 percent of all 
deployed reservists are first responders, totaling 65,954 first responders 
deployed. 
3. Reservists 
a. Lost Civilian Wages.  Bilmes and Stiglitz describe a loss of civilian 
wages when reservists are activated.206  However, contrary to anecdotal stories 
that have appeared in many newspapers over the past few years, Loughran et 
al., estimate that activated reservists actually experience a net gain in income on 
average.  According to their study, while 17% of USRF do experience some net 
income loss, this is exceeded by the number that gain.207  The gain that USRF 
experience in income must be used to offset the opportunity cost to Society in 
general of the Reservists mobilization as represented by their lost civilian wages. 
b. Cost of Injuries.  Reservists have suffered 6,253 wounded in action 
(WIA).208  Of the total number deployed over this period of time, the WIA rate for 
Reservists is 1.52%.  The percent wounded that suffered a severe head injury is 
20%; amputations are 6%; injuries with non-return to duty are 24%; and injuries 
with return to duty are 50%.209 
c. Loss of Job.  Since the Department of Justice was given authority 
over USERRA in 2004, it has brought 16 USERRA complaints to court, resolving 
13 and has filed the first ever USERRA federal class action lawsuit.210  From 
2001 to 2006, we use the 16 reservists that have filed for USERRA protection as 
our metric. 
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d. Self-Employed Business Losses.  Based upon Thompson’s 
analysis of reserve component civilian employment, 9 percent of USRF are self-
employed.211  From 2001 to 2006, 412,215 reservists have deployed in support 
of the GWOT.  We estimate that 37,099 of them are self-employed. 
4. Families 
a. Increased Levels of Child Abuse.  Based upon figures within the 
Status of Forces Surveys cited by Thompson (2007), 53 percent of reservists 
have children.212  We base our estimate of the total number of abused children 
upon the recorded child abuse rates increasing from 5 in 1,000 to 10 in 1,000.  
We estimate that 218,473 reservists who have deployed in support of the GWOT 
have at least one child.  Conservatively, we calculate that 1,092 more children 
suffer some form of child abuse as a result of deployments. 
b. Decreased Children’s Educational Test Scores.  We estimate that 
218,473 reservists who have deployed in support of the GWOT have at least one 
child.  
c. Increased Depression.  We cannot estimate the impact of 
increased depression levels within deployed reserve families. We cannot 
estimate the number of family members suffering from increased depression 
during a deployment. 
d. Increased Divorce Rates.  Army figures report an 84 percent 
increase in divorce rates for deployed families.213   
e. Increased Household Costs.   We calculate this amount by 
multiplying  the total number of reservists deployed in support of GWOT by the 
average increase in household costs. 
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f. Decreased Spousal Earnings.  Thompson (2007) identifies that 56 
percent of all USRF are married based on the 2005 Status of Forces Survey of 
reserve component members.214  Based upon this number 230,840 reservists 
are married during the 2001 to 2006 time frame, and of those that are married, 
60% of spouses are employed, according to a National Military Family 
Association survey.215  However, we cannot estimate the number of spouses 
who have to reduce or stop working as a result of a deployment in support of the 
GWOT. 
g. Increased Health Care Costs.  Increased health care costs are 
recognized but not specified. 
h. Family Disruption Costs.  Other potential costs of disruption are 
recognized but not specified. 
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Table 2.   Detailed Impacts of Employing the Reserves and National 
Guard 
Employers 
Lost Business Productivity 
Hiring Temporary Labor 
Additional Workload Placed on Remaining Staff 
Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees 
Re-Training Returning Employees 
Reduced Innovation 
Government 
Fatality Rates of Reserve Service Members 
Increased Recruiting Costs 
Increased Retention Costs 
Paying for Remote Mental Health Treatment 
Mobilization Costs 
Loss of First Responders 
Reservists 
Lost Civilian Wages 
Cost of Injuries 
Loss of Job 
Self-Employed Business Losses 
Families 
Increased Levels of Child Abuse 
Decreased Children’s Educational Test Scores 
Increased Depression 
Increased Divorce Rates 
Increased Household Costs 
Decreased Spousal Earnings 
Increased Health Care Costs 
Family Disruption Costs 
F. MONETIZATION OF ALL IMPACTS 
1. Employers 
a. Lost Business Productivity.  The Small Business Administration has 
awarded MREIDL loans that average $90,844.  Multiplied by the 371 total 
businesses affected by reservist activations, we estimate the total monetized 
impact of business productivity loss as $33,703,124. 
b. Hiring Temporary Labor.  Senate Bill 1595, introduced in 
September 2003 recommended a tax credit to employers of $6,000 per worker 
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hired to temporarily replace activated reservists.  This credit was intended to 
offset the cost of hiring and training the temporary worker.  We use this figure 
and multiply it by the estimated number of replacement workers hired for a total 
of $675,210,000 cost to employers to hire temporary replacement labor. 
c. Additional Workload on Remaining Staff.  Extrapolating from 
information provided in Loughran et al.’s study, we estimate that the cost of 
placing additional workload on remaining employees is $6,000 per activated 
reservist.  This cost represents additional overtime that remaining employees 
must work to make up for the loss of a reservist, as well as the increased stress 
of the workload, or the cost to the employer for simply setting aside the workload.  
We estimate that the total cost of workload placed on remaining staff of 225,069 
is $1,350,414,000. 
d. Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees.  Based upon Loughran et 
al.’s study of earning losses among activated reservists, we estimate that 
average compensation by employers is $6,000 per reservist.  Multiplied by 
187,558 reservists who are estimated to have received differential pay, we 
estimate businesses have paid $744,224,000 to their reserve employees while 
they have been activated.  These costs, however, represent transfers and hence 
a net social cost of zero to American society.   
e. Re-training Returning Employees.  We base the cost of retraining 
returning employees as one quarter the cost of training temporary replacement 
labor, or $1,500 for each of the estimated 187,558 activated reservists who 
would be trained when returning to their job, totaling $281,337,000. 
f. Reduced Innovation.  Not estimated.  Due to a lack of information, 
we are unable to monetize the impact of reduced innovation. 
2. Government 
a. Fatality Rates for Reservists.  Wallsten and Kosec calculate the 
cost of each KIA according to an economic metric known as the Value of a 
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Statistical Life (VSL).  The VSL represents a willingness to pay for reducing the 
risk of death and is calculated at $6.5 million per individual.216  Multiplied by the 
number of USRF KIA, this impact is monetized at $5,122,000,000. 
b. Increased Recruiting Costs.  The DoD Recruiting Assessment 
identifies the annual cost of recruiting new military personnel in 2000 as $10,500.  
The average cost of recruiting new military personnel has increased to 
$15,286217, we therefore estimate the increased recruiting cost as $4,786 per 
person.  Multiplying this increased cost by the proportion of reservists required to 
meet recruiting goals over the course of 2001 to 2006  of 398,200 personnel, we 
estimate the total cost to be $1,905,785,200. 
c. Increased Retention Costs.  Given that 44 percent of all DoD re-
enlistment bonuses are estimated to be paid to the reserve component, we 
calculate the total impact over the 2001 to 2006 time period to meet reserve 
retention goals as $1,324,400,000. 
d. Paying for Mental Health Treatment.  In her 2007 working paper, 
Bilmes argues that “the average annual cost of treating veterans in the [VA] 
system is now $5,000”.218  Using this as an average cost for providing mental 
health treatment for demobilized reservists yields a total cost of $350,385,000. 
e. Mobilization Costs.  Bilmes and Stiglitz calculate mobilization costs 
at $100,000 per military personnel, which includes both mobilization and 
demobilization.219  Multiplied by the number of USRF, our mobilization costs are 
calculated at $41,221,500,000. 
f. Loss of First Responders.  Senator Chuck Schumer’s U.S. Senate 
press release describes how New York state police and sheriffs departments are 
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paying about $1 million per year “in overtime expenses to pay officers covering 
for deployed reservists.”220  He explains that, “a reservist call-up is expensive for 
local public safety departments because they often pay the salaries and benefits 
of reservists while the reservists are deployed.”221  Given our earlier estimate of 
65,954 first responders, we estimate on average 1,319 first responders among 
each of the 50 states.  We estimate that this amount representing the law 
enforcement community represents approximately 50 percent of first responders, 
with the other 50 percent comprised of such personnel as firefighters and 
paramedics.  Extrapolating from the amount provided by New York State of $1 
million annually or $5 million from 2001 – 2006, we multiply by two to capture the 
costs of the other first responders and then by 50 states for a total cost of 
$500,000,000. 
3. Reservists 
a. Lost Civilian Wages.  Despite Loughran et al.’s estimate that the 
net gain in income achieved by USRF is $11,165 per individual on average, we 
conservatively choose to apply the amount of lost civilian wages identified by 
Bilmes and Stiglitz as $46,000 per individual.222  Multiplying by 412,215, the total 
number of USRF deployed, yields a total net loss of $18,961,890,000. 
b. Cost of Injuries.  Wallsten and Kosec calculate the cost of each 
WIA according to an economic metric known as the Value of a Statistical Injury 
(VSI).  The VSI represents a willingness to pay for reducing the risk of certain 
types of injury and is calculated at different rates depending on the type of injury.  
Severe head traumas have a VSI of $3.4 million; amputations are $880,000 
thousand; injuries with non-return to duty are $260,000; and injuries with return to 
                                            
220 Charles Schumer.  “Schumer: Reservist Call-Up Taking Droves of New York Cops off the 
Streets; Costing Local Police Departments Millions.”  (United States Senate: Press Release, 24 
September 2003). 
221 Ibid. 
222 Bilmes, The Economic Cost of the Iraq War, 14. 
 82
duty are $60,000.223  Multiplied by the number of USRF WIA by the type of injury, 
this impact is monetized at $5,161,220,000. 
c. Loss of Job.  A U.S. District Court in Ohio awarded a USERRA 
plaintiff $33,925.16 in damages and fined Pepsiamericas an additional $50,000 
in punitive damages as well as all attorney’s fees and litigation expenses in 
Koehler v. Pepsiamericas, 18 July 2006.224  Employing this damages award of 
$33,925 as representative of the 16 cases brought to court, we conservatively 
compute a total national impact of $542,800. 
d. Self-Employed Business Losses.  Using the Small Business 
Administration’s estimates of the income of self-employed individuals, we 
estimate that the average self-employed income is $62,500.225  Multiplying this 
figure by 37,099—the total number of self-employed business owners who have 
deployed in support of the GWOT, we estimate that the total cost of self-
employed business losses to be $2,318,687,500. 
4. Families 
a. Increased Levels of Child Abuse.  Not estimated.  We cannot 
estimate the total monetary impact of increased levels of child abuse cases as a 
result of reserve mobilizations because we cannot monetize the impact of an 
abused child. 
b. Decreased Children’s Educational Test Scores.  Not estimated.  
We do not estimate this impact because we cannot monetize the impact of 
decreased children’s educational test scores resulting from deployed reservists. 
c. Increased Depression.  Not estimated.  We cannot estimate the 
monetized impact of increased depression levels because we cannot monetize 
                                            
223 Wallsten, The Economic Cost of the War in Iraq, 12. 
224 Samuel F. Wright. “Willful USERRA Violation: Judge Determines Company’s Denial of 
Wrongdoing is not Credible.”  Law Review 0713, Reserve Officer’s Association, March 2007. 
225 U.S. Small Business Administration, Office of Advocacy. Characteristics of Business 
Owners and Non-Owners, 1998, 3. 
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the wide-ranging effect of increased depression in reserve families during 
deployments. 
d. Increased Divorce Rates.  Not estimated.  We do not estimate this 
impact because be cannot monetize the effect of increased divorce rates among 
reserve families. 
e. Increased Household Costs.  Dewan identifies that many states are 
providing grants to taxpayers.  For example, Illinois offers grants of $500 to 
$2,500 to families of reservists who have been deployed since 11 September 
2001 regardless of whether the family has experienced a loss of income or 
not.226  Taking $500 as an average increase in household costs, multiplied by 
412,215: the number of reservists deployed in support of the GWOT we establish 
a total of $206,107,500.  These costs, however, represent transfers and hence a 
net social cost of zero to American society.   
f. Decreased Spousal Earnings.  Not estimated.  We cannot estimate 
this impact because we cannot monetize the effect of decreased spousal 
earnings. 
g. Increased Health Care Costs.  Not estimated.  Due to a lack of 
information, we are unable to monetize the impact of increased health care.  
However, these costs represent transfers and hence a net social cost of zero to 
American society. 
h. Family Disruption Costs.  Not estimated.  Due to a lack of 
information, we are unable to monetize the impact of family disruption.  However, 
these costs represent transfers and hence a net social cost of zero to American 
society. 
                                            
226 Dewain, “State Taxpayers Providing Relief to Military Families.” 
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Table 3.   Monetized Impacts of Alternative One 
Impact area Monetized Impact 
Employers 
Lost Business Productivity $          33,703,124 
Hiring Temporary Labor $       675,210,000 
Additional Workload Placed on Remaining Staff $    1,350,414,000 
Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees $       744,224,000 
Re-Training Returning Employees $       281,337,000 
Reduced Innovation n.e. 
Government 
Fatality Rates of Reserve Service Members $    5,122,000,000 
Increased Recruiting Costs $    1,905,785,200 
Increased Retention Costs $    1,324,400,000 
Paying for Remote Mental Health Treatment $       350,385,000 
Mobilization Costs $   41,221,500,000 
Loss of First Responders $        500,000,000 
Reservists 
Lost Civilian Wages $ 18,961,890,000 
Cost of Injuries $   5,161,220,000 
Loss of Job $             542,800 
Self-Employed Business Losses $   2,318,687,500 
Families 
Increased Levels of Child Abuse n.e. 
Decreased Children’s Educational Test Scores n.e. 
Increased Depression Levels n.e. 
Increased Divorce Rates n.e. 
Increased Household Costs $     206,107,500 
Decreased Spousal Earnings n.e. 
Increased Health Care Costs n.e. 
Family Disruption Costs n.e. 
n.e.= not estimated 
 
G. ASSESSING THE IMPACTS ON THE COUNTERFACTUAL 
Our counterfactual Alternative Two represents a policy of increasing the 
Active-Duty force by an amount of personnel equal to that employed by the 
USRF in Alternative One, while maintaining the USRF strictly as a strategic 
reserve.  Hence, the 412,215 USRF would be added to the Active-Duty Force, 
with all other considerations between the two alternatives remain equal.  In doing 
so, a number of identified impacts from Alternative One are no longer applicable, 
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since the Reserve Force assumes only full-time Active-Duty personnel are 
employed and their families largely have access to military bases and the support 
services they offer.  As a result, the social cost is mitigated, although we assume 
the budgetary costs are equal; as specified in Alternative One, the budgetary 
cost and effectiveness of a deployed military personnel, whether from the 
Reserve Component or Active Component, are the same. 
1. Employers 
All six impacts affecting employers that have been identified under 
Alternative One are no longer applicable under Alternative Two.  Since all Active-
Duty personnel are considered full-time military employees, there are no longer 
any impacts on civilian employers.  Removing reservists from the force 
employment policy returns the employment market to the more traditional model 
of individuals choosing active duty military service or civilian employment. 
2. Government 
Four of the six government impacts under Alternative One still have direct 
relevance to Alternative Two.  Paying for remote mental health treatment and a 
loss of first responders, however, are no longer applicable under an all Active-
Duty alternative. 
a. Fatality Rates for Active-Duty Service members.  This impact 
recognizes Active-Duty personnel who die in support of the GWOT.  It is 
measured by the number of Active-Duty who suffer GWOT related fatalities.  
Although Active-Duty personnel have suffered a KIA rate of 0.33% during this 
time, we cannot say that there is necessarily a greater likelihood of Active-Duty 
personnel being killed than Reserve Forces.  They may, for example, be 
employed operationally in a way to make their risk of death more likely, or certain 
higher-risk specialties, such as infantry, may be found in the Active-Duty Force.  
Given the fatality risk, we calculate that, as a percentage of the total Active-Duty 
Force employed over the 2001 – 2006 period, 1,360 personnel are classified as 
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hostile/non-hostile killed in action (KIA).227  Using the VSL of $6.5 million and 
multiplying by the number of KIA, we estimate the monetized impact as 
$8,840,000,000. 
b. Increased Recruiting and Retention Costs.  Given that 
recruiting and retention efforts have largely targeted both Active-Duty and 
Reserve personnel in a similar fashion throughout the period of analysis, the 
costs associated with Alternative One to the 44% of the Total Force comprised of 
Reservists is assumed to have been directed to maintaining a 100% Active-Duty 
Force.  As such, we similarly estimate the total increase in recruiting costs to be 
$1,905,785,200 and the increase in retention costs to be $1,324,400,000. 
c. Mobilization Costs.  While there are some additional costs to 
deploying and redeploying individual personnel, this represents a fraction of the 
costs of doing so with USRF through formal mobilization and demobilization.  We 
therefore estimate the expense at 10% of the costs identified under Alternative 
One, for a monetized impact of $4,122,150,000. 
3. Active-Duty Service Members 
Only one of the four impacts identified to affect service members under 
Alternative One still have direct relevance to Alternative Two.  Lost civilian 
wages, loss of job, and self-employed business losses are no longer applicable 
under an all Active-Duty alternative. 
a. Cost of Injuries.  This impact recognizes Active-Duty 
personnel who are wounded in support of the GWOT.  It is measured by the 
number of Active-Duty who suffer GWOT related non-fatal injuries.  Although 
Active-Duty personnel have suffered a WIA rate of 2.25% during this time, we 
cannot say that there is necessarily a greater likelihood of Active-Duty personnel 
                                            
227 Defense Manpower Data Center, Personnel & Procurement Reports and Data Files.  The 
actual number of Active-Duty KIA during this time frame was 3,444 out of a total Active-Duty force 
employed of 1,044,939, yielding the KIA rate of 0.33%, almost 75% greater than that of 
Reservists. 
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being injured than Reserve Forces, in a similar manner to the relationship posited 
for KIA rates.  As with those KIA, Active-Duty personnel may be employed 
operationally in a way to make their risk of injury more likely, or certain higher-
risk specialties, such as infantry, may be found in the Active-Duty Force and 
hence increase the rate of injury.  Given the risk of injury, we calculate that, as a 
percentage of the total Active-Duty Force employed over the 2001 – 2006 period, 
9,274 personnel are classified as hostile/non-hostile wounded in action (WIA).228  
Using the VSI breakout and multiplying by the number of WIA, we estimate the 
monetized impact as $13,083,200,000. 
4. Families 
All eight impacts identified to service members under Alternative One 
have direct relevance to Alternative Two.  To varying degrees, Active-Duty 
personnel deploying in support of the GWOT place a tremendous burden upon 
their families.  In many respects, the average costs to families of Active-Duty 
personnel is estimated to be lower compared to USRF families, due to their 
proximity to major military bases and the support network and facilities such 
installations provide.  Nevertheless, while recognizing that these impacts are 
nearly universal among families of deployed service members, we also are 
unable to provide a detailed quantification or monetization of the costs beyond 
those already explored in Alternative One.  The only quantified impact from 
Alternative One, increased household costs, is estimated to be approximately 
50% of the costs to Reservists, given access to commissaries, on-base housing, 
and other forms of subsidized assistance.  As such, the total impact is estimated 
at $103,053,750. 
 
                                            
228 Defense Manpower Data Center, Personnel & Procurement Reports and Data Files.  The 
actual number of Active-Duty WIA during this time frame was 23,507 out of a total Active-Duty 
force employed of 1,044,939, yielding the WIA rate of 2.25%, almost 48% greater than that of 
Reservists.  The amount presented in the counterfactual represents the proportional increase in 
WIA, and not the total cost of all WIA under this alternative. 
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Table 4.   Monetized Impacts of Alternative Two 
Impact area Monetized Impact 
Employers 
Lost Business Productivity n.a. 
Hiring Temporary Labor n.a. 
Additional Workload Placed on Remaining Staff n.a. 
Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees n.a. 
Re-Training Returning Employees n.a. 
Reduced Innovation n.a. 
Government 
Fatality Rates of Active-Duty Service Members $    8,840,000,000 
Increased Recruiting Costs $    1,905,785,200 
Increased Retention Costs $    1,324,400,000 
Paying for Remote Mental Health Treatment n.a. 
Mobilization Costs $    4,122,150,000 
Loss of First Responders n.a. 
Active-Duty Service members 
Lost Civilian Wages n.a. 
Cost of Injuries $  13,083,200,000 
Loss of Job n.a. 
Self-Employed Business Losses n.a. 
Families 
Increased Levels of Child Abuse n.e. 
Decreased Children’s Educational Test Scores n.e. 
Increased Depression Levels n.e. 
Increased Divorce Rates n.e. 
Increased Household Costs $      103,053,750 
Decreased Spousal Earnings n.e. 
Increased Health Care Costs n.e. 
Family Disruption Costs n.e. 
n.a.= not applicable     n.e.= not estimated  
 
H. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
Our analysis has revealed that the costs of Alternative One throughout the 
2001 to 2006 time period exceed Alternative Two by $49,931,539,424.  Figure 9 
presents the total impacts on American society for both alternatives, specified for 
both quantitative and nonquantitative social costs.  The budgetary costs are 
calculated to reflect the proportional amount of using the 412,215 personnel 
(approximately 28% of the Total Force employed) either as USRF in Alternative 
One or as Active Duty personnel in Alternative Two based on CBO estimates.  In 
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both cases, we assume that the budgetary costs are equal, even though the 
Administration may have believed that the budgetary costs associated with 
Alternative Two exceeded those of Alternative One.  Economic costs for the 
other 72% of the Total Force are not analyzed since they are the same Active-
Duty forces under each alternative.  However, based on this cost-benefit 
analysis, it is clear that Reserve Force utilization in support of the GWOT as an 
operational force is much more expensive than increasing the Active Duty force 
while maintaining the USRF as a strategic reserve when an analysis of total 
economic costs is undertaken. 
The largest social costs are mobilization costs and lost civilian wages.  
Most other impacts amount to hundreds of millions, if not several billion, dollars.  
In some cases, impacts represent transfers within American society, such as in 
paying salaries of deployed employees and increased household costs, and such 
impacts yield a net social cost of zero.  The difference in social costs between 
both alternatives is significant enough to demonstrate that Reserve utilization 
represents a 172 percent cost premium in social costs and a 28 percent cost 
premium in total economic cost when budget costs are included.  These ratios 
are calculated by dividing the amount (whether social cost or total economic cost) 
in Alternative One by Alternative Two.  In either calculation, the impact is 
significant to American society. 
As discussed in our methodology chapter, there are a number of errors 
that plague any cost-benefit analysis, and this analysis is no exception.  Potential 
errors in our analysis include: omission, forecasting, measurement, and valuation 
errors. These errors can have profound impacts on the results of CBA.  
While we have mitigated these errors, they are difficult to completely 
dismiss.  We have attempted to provide a comprehensive list of social cost 
impacts, but we may have excluded other significant impacts.  We limited 
potential forecasting errors by employing an ex post CBA.  Measurement errors 
may present a significant source of error in our analysis.  Our numbers are 
offered for comparison only.   
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I. CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we focused on developing a cost-benefit analysis as we 
had outlined in our methodology.  We specified two primary alternatives, 
determined who had standing, and then determined the impacts of the policy 
alternatives—quantitatively and qualitatively—as necessary over the period of 
analysis.  Monetization of impacts facilitated a comparison of both alternatives 
and we concluded that the social costs of Alternative One exceeded those of 
Alternative Two.  As such, we posit that the policy of employing the U.S. military 
Reserve Forces as an operational force from 2001 to 2006 has not been more 
cost effective than the counterfactual alternative of increasing active duty end 
strength to meet the manpower requirements of fighting the Global War on 






Figure 9.   GWOT Reserve Force Utilization Cost-Benefit Analysis229 
GWOT Reserve Utilization CBA 
   
 Perspective of American Society ($2006 ) 
 Alternative One Alternative Two 






Policy Costs:   
  Quantified Social Costs   
Lost Business Productivity $           33,703,124 n.a. 
Hiring Temporary Labor $         675,210,000 n.a. 
Additional Workload Placed on Remaining Staff $      1,350,414,000 n.a. 
Paying Salaries for Deployed Employees* $                           0 n.a. 
Re-Training Returning Employees $         281,337,000 n.a. 
Fatality Rates of Service Members $      5,122,000,000 $      8,840,000,000 
Increased Recruiting Costs $      1,905,785,200 $      1,905,785,200 
Increased Retention Costs $      1,324,400,000 $      1,324,400,000 
Paying for Remote Mental Health Treatment $         350,385,000 n.a. 
Mobilization Costs $    41,221,500,000 $      4,122,150,000 
Loss of First Responders $         500,000,000 n.a. 
Lost Civilian Wages $    18,961,890,000 n.a. 
Cost of Injuries $      5,161,220,000 $    13,083,200,000 
Loss of Job $                542,800 n.a. 
Self-Employed Business Losses $      2,318,687,500 n.a. 
Increased Household Costs* $                          0 $                           0 
  Unquantified Social Costs   
Reduced Innovation n.e. n.e. 
Increased Levels of Child Abuse n.e. n.e. 
Decreased Children’s Educational Test Scores n.e. n.e. 
Increased Depression Levels n.e. n.e. 
Increased Divorce Rates n.e. n.e. 
Decreased Spousal Earnings n.e. n.e. 
Increased Health Care Costs* n.e. n.e. 
Family Disruption Costs* n.e. n.e. 
Total Social Costs $    79,207,074,624 $    29,275,535,200 
Total Budgetary Costs $  149,240,000,000 $  149,240,000,000 
   
Total Economic Costs $  228,447,074,624 $  178,515,535,200 
n.a.= not applicable     n.e.= not estimated     * = transfer   
                                            
229 This chart is inspired by the CBA accounting work sheet presented in Sassone and 
Schaffer, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 172.  Within their work sheet, the delineate between the benefits 
and costs of monetized and non-monetized effects. As they emphasize, their worksheet is meant 
primarily as a heuristic device and that the general goal of any summary is that it should be 
“clear, succinct, complete, and understandable.”  We agree with their concluding point that “a 
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
A. SUMMARY 
This project developed a model that can shed light on our primary 
question: is the current policy of employing the U.S. military Reserve Forces as 
an operational force more cost effective than the alternative of increasing active-
duty end strength to meet the manpower requirements of the Global War on 
Terrorism while keeping the Reserve Forces as a strategic force in readiness?  
We have estimated that employing the USRF as an operational force incurred 
social costs $50 billion more than increasing the Active Duty component to meet 
force requirements over the 2001 to 2006 GWOT project life—or nearly $10 
billion per year. 
We have also considered the following secondary questions: 
1.  What is the Current Total Force Structure (Alternative 1)? 
The first (status quo) policy alternative is employing the USRF as an 
operational force in fighting the GWOT. Today’s policy selects and employs 
USRF to execute missions, as well as augmenting and reinforcing the active 
component.  Reserves currently comprise 44 percent of the Total Force, and 
deployed a total of over 60 million duty-days in 2004 (over 28% of all U.S. forces 
deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan).   
2. What would the Total Force Structure be if Reserve Forces 
were kept as a Supporting Reserve (Alternative 2)? 
We estimate that the active component would have increased by 412,215 
man-years in order to meet in-theater GWOT personnel demands from 2001 to 
2006 if USRF were not employed actively.  This represents an in-theater annual 
personnel average of 82,443 man-years. 
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3. What are the Budgetary Costs Associated with the 
Alternatives? 
Considerable effort has been put into estimating the budgetary costs of 
the GWOT.  However, it is difficult to calculate these costs because they are 
found as both regularly appropriated defense funds and as supplemental budget 
allocations.  We accept Robert Sunshine’s estimate of $602 billion in direct war 
budgetary costs and specifically, $533 billion for military operations; we then 
equally apportion to each alternative based on a proportional basis of the Total 
Force employed in fighting the GWOT.  As Reserve Utilization from 2001 – 2006 
averaged 28 percent, we estimate this amount to be approximately $149 billion.  
This figure represents the direct budgetary cost to taxpayers for the 
Congressionally appropriated amount of funds to support GWOT operations, 
including funds for military personnel, operations and maintenance, and 
procurement. 
4. What are the Non-Budgetary Social Costs Associated with the 
Alternatives? 
We have identified 24 social cost impacts associated with USRF 
employment.  As shown in Figure 9, the total non-budgetary social costs 
associated with Alternative 1 is about $79 billion.  The total non-budgetary social 
costs associated with Alternative 2 is about $29 billion.  Current policy 
(Alternative 1) represents a 28 percent cost increase in total economic cost; the 
impact is significant to American society.230 
5. What Social Costs are Mainly Transfers? 
In some cases, impacts represent transfers within American society, such 
as paying salaries of deployed employees and increased household costs; such 
                                            
230 The 28 percent increase in total economic cost is calculated by dividing the total 
economic cost of Alternative 1 ($228 billion) by the total economic cost of Alternative 2 ($178 
billion).  Amounts correspond to the percent of reserve utilization in Alternative 1 and an equal 
amount for increasing Active Duty forces in Alternative 2.  We discuss these figures in detail in 
the GWOT Reserve Force Utilization CBA in Figure 9. 
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impacts have a net social cost of zero.  While it may be argued that transfers are 
not social costs because of the zero net value, we feel the social impacts are 
important to identify and include in the calculus.  Furthermore, whether or not 
transfers are included in the overall calculation of social costs, the difference in 
social costs between the alternatives is significant. 
B. SIGNIFICANT ISSUES FOR FURTHER STUDY 
Our study raises a number of significant issues for further study. 
First, as Loughran points out, “future research should consider what kind 
of compensation reforms are likely to be most cost-effective in attracting and 
retaining reservists in an era in which the probability of activation is substantially 
above historical norms.”231  Accompanied by the efficiency arguments of 
conscription versus all-volunteer force sustainment, it will be important to 
understand the costs associated with sustaining an all-volunteer reserve 
component given its employment methods. 
Second, many social costs associated with employing either the reserve 
or active components are not clearly understood.  Future study of the costs of 
deployed military members would be helpful to understand the true costs of 
employing the military.  The costs that society bears for increased divorce rates, 
increased child abuse, lower educational test scores, reduced business 
innovation, increased depression levels, lower spousal earnings, increased 
family health care costs, and family disruption costs resulting from deployments 
are not fully understood by policy makers, yet these costs may have significant 
affects on society as a result of policy decisions. 
Third, the impact of losing first responders is not well defined.  It is clear 
that state and local governments bear costs for deployed first responders through 
overtime salaries for remaining staff and continued salary payments for those 
deployed.  But additional costs may be borne during natural disasters such as 
                                            
231 Loughran, “Activation and the Earnings of Reservists”, 74. 
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Hurricane Katrina and wild fires in Southern California.  Additional contractor 
support may be necessary to deal with such disasters when first government 
agency first responders are not available.  These contracts may drive up disaster 
relief bills significantly. 
Fourth, we made specific assumptions limiting the scope of our analysis.  
Expanding the alternatives considered both spatially and temporally would 
provide useful material for further research.  It would be interesting to consider 
other levels of force structure, to obtain better data on specific impacts, to 
consider a longer time period, and to gain a higher degree of granularity.  
Sensitivity analysis along any of these dimensions would further enrich 
understanding of the costs of reserve utilization in fighting the GWOT. 
C. CONCLUSION 
It appears that a good CBA could inform defense personnel policy for the 
GWOT.  Our ex post results may provide ex ante support for policy makers.  
Furthermore, developing and implementing a model such as ours may improve 
organizational learning and memory regarding alternative force structures and 
their social costs. 
In its Second Report to Congress on 1 March 2007, the Commission on 
the National Guard and Reserves stated that “the current posture and utilization 
of the National Guard and Reserve as an ‘operational force’ is not sustainable 
over time, and if not corrected with significant changes to law and policy, the 
reserve component’s ability to serve our nation will diminish.”232  The GAO 
echoed these comments, stating that “DoD does not have the strategic 
framework and associated policies necessary to maximize reserve component 
force availability for a long-term Global War on Terrorism.”233 
                                            
232 Commission on the National Guard and Reserves. Second Report to Congress. 1 March 
2007, 38. 
233 Government Accountability Office, Military Personnel: A Strategic Approach is Needed to 
Address Long-term Guard and Reserve Force Availability, GAO-05-285T (Washington, D.C.: 2 
February 2005). 
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Therefore, current force policy is inadequate to sustain a long war against 
terrorism as well as provide more conventional defense roles.  Careful 
consideration of future force development and force employment policies, as well 
as the costs involved, is going to be critical to sustain an effective national 
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